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ABSTRACT 
The National Football League (NFL) has become the unofficial national pastime 
in the United States due to its massive popularity in terms of game attendance, television 
viewership, and annual revenues. Because the league is far and away the most popular 
professional sports league in the world, there exists a risk that its games will be targeted 
by terrorists seeking either to announce their agenda or simply to inflict as many 
casualties as possible. My thesis answers the following questions: How adequate is 
security at non-Super Bowl NFL games against potential terrorist attacks? And how can 
the government and the league best manage this interface of public and private issues—
and secure major-league regular season football games and their tailgates effectively and 
in a manner that does not scare away the fan base? Additionally, the thesis draws 
comparative lessons from the security programs at U.S. international airports and 
in the English Premier League. It concludes that the NFL has largely succeeded in its 
protective efforts but must yet improve security in tailgating areas, especially in 
surrounding private lots. 
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Professional football attendance is a weekly ritual in the United States from the 
late summer through the winter, and this pastime is firmly entrenched in American 
culture. Every Sunday during the football season, millions of Americans watch National 
Football League (NFL) games either in person or on television. Each game on Monday, 
Thursday, or Sunday attracts 60,000–90,000 fans into each stadium; the National 
Broadcast Company (NBC) televises the Sunday Night Football game of the week, which 
attracts the highest viewer averages of any television program with 21 million Americans 
watching each game.1 In all, the NFL earns $9 billion each year and stands to make as 
much as “$25 billion in annual revenues for the league by the year 2027.”2 For all of 
these reasons, a regular season NFL football game could make a tempting target for 
terrorists of any stripe looking to make a lethal splash, garner headlines, or instill fear in 
the U.S. public. 
While the biggest game—the Super Bowl itself—receives extra attention from 
law enforcement and other homeland security officials looking to secure the big-draw 
championship match, all other NFL games are subject to less obvious and less complete 
security measures, perhaps because they are part of the national routine. If the security 
plan for regular season NFL games is inadequate, then the potential for a terrorist attack 
rises considerably, as does the potential for a high loss of life among the thousands of 
fans these events attract. 
There are counter-pressures, as well. Security costs money, and the franchises are, 
in the end, private ventures. League owners have priorities in addition to—or other 
than—security, while the government can only regulate or require so much security. On 
the other hand, as events in November 2015 in Paris showed, everyday people gathered to 
                                                 
1 Lynette Rice, “How Did the Big Bang Theory Fare? Top 20 Most-Watched Shows This Fall,” 
PEOPLE.com, last modified January 2, 2015, http://www.people.com/article/top-shows-fall-2014-big-
bang-theory-nfl-scandal-ncis. 
2 Monte Burke, “How the National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion in Annual Revenues,” 
Forbes, last modified August 17, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2013/08/17/how-the-
national-football-league-can-reach-25-billion-in-annual-revenues/#2dada1cf3ad0. 
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engage in normal leisure activities—dining out, attending a concert, or watching a sports 
event—need and expect a high level of security. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Is security at non-Super Bowl NFL games sufficiently protective against potential 
terrorist attacks and, if so, how can the government and the league best manage this 
interface of public and private issues to secure major-league regular season football 
games effectively—in a manner that does not scare away the fan base? Additionally, 
what lessons might be learned from American international airports and English Premier 
League (EPL), two comparative cases of the protection of large numbers of people in a 
public setting? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Research completed as recently as 2014 analyzed the terrorism threat on all 
American sporting events, “such as NFL, MLB [Major League Baseball], MiLB [Minor 
League Baseball] or NCAA [National Collegiate Athletic Association] athletic events.”3 
Some American sporting events, such as NFL regular season games, are at a greater risk 
of attack because the areas in and near the stadiums are readily accessible to the general 
public. At the same time, less security is provided to NFL regular season games because 
homeland security experts attach a low Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) rating 
to these events, which limits federal funding for its security apparatus.4 
The U.S. National Football League is the premier professional sports league. The 
NFL leads in terms of viewership for a professional league not only in the United States, 
but it absolutely dominates the rest of the world. According to Forbes magazine, the NFL 
has 20 of the world’s top 50 wealthiest professional franchises, and that is out of a total of 
32 NFL teams.5 The NFL reportedly earns roughly $9 billion a year, and the second place 
                                                 
3 James M. Gehring, “Sports Venue Security: Public Policy Options for SEAR 4–5 Events,” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), XX. 
4 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” XX. 




professional league, the English Premier soccer league, earns $2.7 billion.6 In 2013, the 
NFL accounted for 46 “of the 50 most watched sporting events” that year.7 For these 
reasons, and because the NFL has such a large attendance at its games, NFL events 
would appear to be a more attractive target for a terrorist attack than those of the National 
Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball, and National Basketball Association 
(NBA). Moreover, in the hours leading up to the kickoff, all NFL games also have 
thousands more people within close proximity to the stadium, tailgating, dining out, 
drinking in a bar, shopping for NFL apparel in the team store, or employed in some 
capacity. The tailgate prior to an NFL regular season football game is an event in and of 
itself. Most of the tailgate areas are situated within viewing distance of the football 
stadium, and the tailgate experience starts hours prior to the game and will resume at its 
conclusion. On game days, the large but also congested tailgate areas are packed with 
fans who are drinking, barbequing, eating, and socializing. 
The attacks in Paris at a soccer game and rock concert in November 2015 
demonstrated the different ways in which terrorists can strike without warning; these 
attacks also targeted Western culture in general.8 If attacks like these were to occur at an 
NFL game, the loss of life could be much higher than the death tolls in the Paris attacks. 
The immediate and intensive media response would spread lasting corrosive effects of 
terrorism in the wake of such a catastrophe. 
This research analyzes the security measures in place at NFL games, and, 
although it finds the NFL largely well-secured, it also makes some prescriptions to 
further the League’s efforts and to protect football fans and players even more 
effectively. Analysis of the comparative cases of American international airports and EPL 
soccer—both of which have enacted major security upgrades and face ongoing 
                                                 
6 Ivana Kottasova, “English Soccer Is Now World’s 2nd Richest Sport,” CNN, last modified February 
11, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/02/11/news/economy/english-soccer-football-rights/. 
7 Cork Gaines, “The NFL Still Destroys the Other Sports in the Battle for TV Ratings,” Business 
Insider, last modified January 2, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/nfl-tv-ratings-2014-1. 
8 Steve Almasy, Pierre Meilhan, and Jim Bittermann, “Paris Massacre: At Least 128 Killed in Gunfire 
and Blasts, French Officials Say,” CNN, last modified November 14, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/13/world/paris-shooting/. 
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challenges—may highlight opportunities for the NFL to improve its security plans to help 
mitigate the likelihood of an attack. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich was the first, and arguably the most 
horrendous, terrorist attack at a major sporting event. Specifically, members of the Israeli 
national team were targeted and assassinated by Palestinian terrorists. The group 
responsible for the attack, Black September, wanted to use the Olympics as a platform to 
announce its grievances, knowing that the world would take notice.9 
Munich was not the only attack at a major international sporting event. The 
Atlanta Olympics in 1996 and the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 were both 
examples of large-scale, highly publicized domestic attacks that changed how Americans 
collectively view sporting events, from safe to potentially unsafe. Eric Rudolph, author of 
the Atlanta bombings, was an “antigovernment fanatic” whose “grievance was anti-
abortion” based.10 Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the brothers responsible for the 
Boston Marathon bombings, embarked on their murderous plans because they were angry 
with U.S. “military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan,” which they viewed as a general U.S. 
“conspiracy against Muslims.”11 Neither Rudolph nor the Tsarnaev brothers had any 
specific grievance against the people they killed and injured; rather, they wanted to 
“embarrass” the U.S. government.12 
James Gehring states the threat of terrorism at sporting events is high because of 
its cultural significance in society, let alone the large attendance at given events. Gehring 
writes: “Because sporting events warrant a tremendous level of advertising, strong links 
of support from alcohol producers, and flashy displays by female cheerleaders, an attack 
on such a venue can support a vehement cultural judgment assailing American societal 
                                                 
9 Annette Vowinckel, “Sports, Terrorism and the Media: The Munich Hostage Crisis of 1972,” 
Esporte e Sociedade 2, no. 6 (June 2007): 7, http://www.uff.br/esportesociedade/pdf/es602.pdf. 
10 Ramon Spaaij and Mark S. Hamm, “Endgame? Sports Events as Symbolic Targets in Lone Wolf 
Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, June 2015, 4, doi:10.1080/1057610X.2015.1076695. 
11 Spaaij and Hamm, “Endgame,” 8. 
12 Spaaij and Hamm, “Endgame,” 8. 
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values.”13 The importance of sports in America will lend a greater degree of exposure to 
a potential attack because “research shows that these events have become viable, valuable 
terrorist targets because of increasing attendance and rapidly expanding exposure via 
cable television, satellite broadcasts, and the Internet.”14 The NFL clearly fits this 
description of a high-profile target. 
The NFL could also become the target of an attack since it has been instrumental 
in the growth and economic prowess of the cities that have a franchise. Resultantly, these 
franchises are believed “to symbolize a city’s emerging or declining urban status and 
business climate.”15 The NFL is potentially at risk because it represents “a very symbolic 
target of terrorism because it is so associated with the globalization of the American 
economy and the American culture.”16 
While an NFL game has not yet been attacked, the league has been targeted in the 
past. A year after the 9/11 attacks, “the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a 
vague alert warning that people with suspected ties to terrorist groups had used the 
Internet to access information on sports stadiums in the United States and Europe, 
including the RCA Dome in Indianapolis and the Edward Jones Dome in St. Louis.”17 
The implication of the FBI’s statement is that terrorists were attempting to find 
avenues to attack an NFL game based on perceived weaknesses of stadium designs and 
security schemes. A terrorist attack at a packed NFL stadium could be devastating if 
executed effectively. For example, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) study that 
focused on the potential consequences of an attack at a sporting game demonstrated that 
                                                 
13 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” 5. 
14 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” i. 
15 Kimberly S. Schimmel, “Protecting the NFL/ Militarizing the Homeland: Citizen Soldiers and 
Urban Resilience in Post-9/11 America,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 47, no. 3 (2012): 
342, doi:10.1177/1012690211433479. 
16 Richard H. Fallon et al., “Panel I: Legal Issues in Sports Security,” Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media and Entertainment Law Journal 13, no. 2 (April 2003): 366, 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1257&context=iplj. 
17 Spaaij and Hamm, “Endgame,” 3. 
 6
“a biological attack on a sports arena…would potentially kill 2,500 people.”18 Therefore, 
the NFL should first be concerned for the safety of its fans in mitigating terrorist threats, 
and then worry about the economic aspects of its business.19 
Despite the perception that NFL games are attractive targets to terrorists, some 
question the value of introducing additional safety measures. Kimberly Schimmel cites 
the negative effects to liberty and free movement within close proximity to major sports 
events: 
Congratulations local citizens! Your city has just won the right to host the 
next major sport event! … Oh, and you can also expect to be surveilled, 
digitally scanned, corralled, barricaded, patted-down, have your city 
permanently reconfigured and militarized, your traffic patterns altered, and 
your domestic legal structures ignored. Enjoy the games!20 
A Senior Writer for ESPN, Tim Keown, echoes this concern by describing 
his general discontent and irritation with attending NFL games because the 
“hassle/cost/indignity/danger of attending” games diminishes the positive atmosphere 
provided to fans.21 The cost of extra security is that the “intensifying militarization of 
urban space” for the sake of sports has in some ways downgraded the “quality of life for 
urban residents.”22 The counter-argument that favors more security at the expense of 
liberty is that since 9/11 the addition of more security personnel and technologies “had to 
be implemented for the safety of the fans and athletes” because the threat warrants the 
methods.23 
                                                 
18 Stacey Hall, Lou Marciani, and Walter Cooper, “Sport Venue Security: Planning and Preparedness 
for Terrorist-Related Incidents,” The Smart Journal 4, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2008): 7, 
http://www.thesmartjournal.com/venues.pdf. 
19 Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence. Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security 
for Sporting and Entertainment Venues Resource Guide, CCICADA, 36, last modified July 2013, 
http://ccicada.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/CCICADA_Stadium-Security_Best-Practices-Guide.pdf. 
20 Kimberly S. Schimmel, “Major Sport Events and Global Threats/Responses,” Criminal Justice 
Matters 88, no. 1 (June 2012): 20, doi:10.1080/09627251.2012.695502. 
21 Tim Keown, “Check Your Dignity at the NFL Door,” ESPN: Entertainment and Sports 
Programming Network, last modified September 20, 2011, 
http://m.espn.go.com/wireless/story?storyId=6996681&lang=ES&wjb=. 
22 Schimmel, “Major Sport Events and Global Threats,” 21. 
23 Steven H. Appelbaum, Ethan Adeland, and Jake Harris, “Management of Sports Facilities: Stress 
and Terrorism since 9/11,” Management Research News 28, no. 7 (2005): 80, 
doi:10.1108/01409170510784896. 
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Airport security provides one model not only for the methods and measures that 
may work in such a crowded commercial venue but also for the larger debates about 
securitizing these spaces. Mark Salter states that airports “have become sites of intense 
surveillance, policing, and control” because “public and private authorities have taken 
advantage of the liminal character of airports to conduct policing and border functions, 
which take place inside the state but at the margins of the law.”24 
The proliferation of additional security technologies in international airports has 
been argued to lead to some misuse and mishandling of personal information and aspects 
of privacy invasion. Data obtained from travelers during the screening process at 
international airports “may be vulnerable to forms of fraud or other misuse among 
employees who handle the data.”25 Beyond the aspect of fraud and potential identity 
theft, personal privacy is at stake with the use of active millimeter-wave scanners (AMS), 
which is synonymous with whole-body scanners (WBS), to check travelers through the 
security line because the machine performs a scan that portrays the physical traits and 
composition of the individual ranging from aspects of shape, size, color as shown 
underneath the clothing, which may be in conflict with “medical privacy issues.”26 
Daniel Solove poses the question of whether law-abiding citizens should be adverse to 
additional government intrusions based on their belief of no wrongdoings.27 This idea 
plays into the question of balancing privacy and security, as Solove states the argument 
from both sides: “if you have nothing to hide, then what do you have to fear?” against “If 
you aren’t doing anything wrong, then what do you have to hide?”28 These sensitivities 
about privacy seem even more acute in the context of sport and leisure. 
                                                 
24 Mark B. Salter, Politics at the Airport (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), xi. 
25 Salter, Politics at the Airport, 31. 
26 Govert Valkenburg and Irma Van der Ploeg, “Materialities between Security and Privacy: A 
Constructivist Account of Airport Security Scanners,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 4 (July 2015): 339, 
doi:10.1177/0967010615577855. 
27 Daniel Solove, “‘I've Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,” San Diego 
Law Review 44 (2007): 746, 
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=faculty_publications. 
28 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 747. 
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The EPL’s security scheme provides a useful comparison for the NFL since they 
are the two most profitable sporting leagues in the world. The British soccer league 
suffered a massive decline in the numbers of fans attending matches in the 1980s when 
“hooliganism was a fundamental social problem.”29 As a result of numerous violent 
outbreaks and other safety issues at matches, the league and English government 
“brought about a programme of change which has seen the gradual transformation of 
English stadia and the introduction of a new system of stadium safety management.”30 
The transformations enacted in response to safety and security issues saved the league, 
and allowed for growth into its current highly profitable state. 
While many of the changes to promote security at EPL matches are viewed 
positively, others have received some negative feedback from fans. For example, the 
league introduced a series of Football Banning Orders (FBOs) starting in the late 1980s to 
prevent offenders from attending further matches, or from even travelling abroad while 
their team plays outside of the United Kingdom (U.K.). The British government allowed 
for the FBOs to be far-reaching to prevent “the acute political embarrassment arising 
from repeated acts of ‘rioting’ involving English fans attending football matches 
abroad.”31 Both affected fans and civil rights agencies are critical of the FBOs because 
the rules can be applied without proper legal proceedings, or even the right for appeals.32 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The recent terrorist attacks in Paris showed that terrorists do not necessarily have 
to target the grandest stages, such as the Super Bowl, to achieve their mission of 
attacking Western culture and receiving extensive global media coverage. The particular 
concert and friendly soccer match in the Paris attacks were not inherently special events 
                                                 
29 R. T. Jewell, Rob Simmons, and Stefan Szymanski, “Bad for Business? The Effects of Hooliganism 
on English Professional Football Clubs,” Journal of Sports Economics 15, no. 5 (2014): 429, 
doi:10.1177/1527002514535169. 
30 Chris Whalley, “Stadium Safety Management in England,” The Official website of the English 
Football Association, accessed April 22, 2016, http://www.thefa.com/football-rules-
governance/more/stadium-safety. 
31 Clifford Stott and Geoff Pearson, “Football Banning Orders, Proportionality, and Public Order 
Policing,” Howard Journal 45, no. 3 (July 2006): 241, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2311.2006.00419.x. 
32 Stott and Pearson, “Football Banning Orders,” 244. 
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that would warrant much in the way of national or international headlines, but now the 
entire world knows that the Eagles of Death Metal were playing during the attack at the 
Bataclan. A terrorist action at a less-fortified regular season football game could fall into 
the same trap as the concert hall in Paris because people in general expect the larger scale 
event, such as Super Bowl, to be the probable target. 
The likelihood of a successful terrorist attack at a sporting event may be linked to 
the threat level classification provided. Major sporting events, such as the Summer 
Olympics and the Super Bowl, receive massive numbers of VIPs, high general 
attendance, and heavy media coverage, which forces planners to increase their security 
measures to deter an attack at these events. Such high-profile sports events receive a 
Special Event Assessment Rating of SEAR 1, which provides the highest level of 
protection and also allocates federal funding and resources under the purview of the 
Principle Federal Official (PFO) in the Department of Homeland Security.33 The Super 
Bowl allocates massive amounts of money for the one-day sporting event. In 2014, the 
security “protection mission with SEAR 1 security measures at the… Super Bowl in New 
Jersey cost $17.7 million.”34 Currently, other NFL games are considered SEAR 4 events, 
which receive minimal federal funding and support, and even then only by specific 
request.35 Large amounts of federal funding for SEAR 1 events make them tougher 
targets. Therefore, there is a potential “that terrorists will pivot to softer SEAR 4–5 event 
targets,” which includes regular season NFL games.36 
On one hand, the NFL has not had a terrorist attack at a single game in the 
post-9/11 era, which is significant considering that thousands of games and more than a 
decade separate the current time from the attacks on New York City and Washington, 
DC, in 2001. On the other hand, the NFL has been unsuccessfully targeted since 9/11, 
and attacks at other sporting events have been successful to terrorists by giving them a 
                                                 
33 Mario Carrillo, Jean Lumley, and Bill Lowry, “National Special Security Events (NSSE),” 
(presentation, Unclassified Brief involving USNORTHCOM, FBI Miami, Dolphin Stadium Security, 
Miami, FL, March 4, 2008), 7–9. 
34 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” 53. 
35 Carrillo, Lumley, and Lowry, “National Special Security Events (NSSE),” 9; 41. 
36 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” 53. 
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media platform to announce their views and agendas. My hypothesis is that the changes 
the NFL has made each year since 9/11 have made their games less vulnerable to a 
terrorist attack than they were before, but that is only applicable to the confines of the 
stadium itself, with only modest improvements having been made to the secondary 
perimeter around the stadium and beyond. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research has been purposefully broad in order to adequately answer this 
question. My research used the following terms to search for relevant material: NFL, 
Security, Sports Terrorism, Post 9/11 Security, Airport Security, Legal Aspects of Mass 
Gatherings, and Law Enforcement at Sporting Events, to name a few. Essentially, I built 
a foundation to demonstrate a multifaceted approach to answering this complex question. 
First, the NFL has not been the victim of a terrorist attack. Thus, my research must first 
prove, or at least demonstrate, the relative attractiveness of a terrorist organization 
attacking the NFL due to size of the gatherings and potential media coverage associated 
with the attack. 
Second, I did not limit my research to NFL security because some sources group 
American sports security measures together, so I could miss part of the security puzzle as 
it applies to the NFL. Third, I limited my searches to after September 11, 2001, because 
many would agree the entire security enterprise has changed dramatically since those 
attacks on U.S. soil. Most sources, however, fall between 2008 and 2015 based on the 
applicability and relevance of the source to answering my question. 
Fourth, because the NFL is the leader in American sports security, I looked at 
airport security to see what measures could beneficial for adoption by the NFL to 
improve the safety of its fans. Fifth, I explored what security measures are currently 
being used in the EPL, to determine what security measures are working in the U.K. that 
may be useful to the NFL. And, finally, I analyzed the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 
and how these attacks have relevance to the security of the NFL at its regular season 
games. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The second chapter looks at aviation Security in American international airports. 
The purpose of looking into the security realm of airports is that, much like the NFL on a 
game day, the institution is responsible for the security of its thousands of customers who 
go through the security process. This chapter examines how the airline industry has been 
affected by terrorist attacks such as 9/11, and how the industry has adapted major (and 
highly intrusive) counter-terrorism measures and yet still has remained financially viable. 
The focus of the third chapter is on security plans used for EPL soccer. The 
reasons for looking specifically at the Premier League, as opposed to all professional 
soccer leagues or other sports, is to draw a useful comparison between the security 
calculus employed by the two largest sports leagues in the world. Additionally, the 
American law system is similar in many facets to the English legal system, so the security 
application can be compared more directly. In addition, within their common-law system, 
English citizens tend to embrace ideals of personal privacy akin to their American 
counterparts. 
The fourth chapter demonstrates the NFL’s cultural relevance and discusses the 
specific security plans used by the league. This chapter looks into the NFL’s security 
plan, who is funding the security, how security at NFL regular season games is different 
from the Super Bowl or other major sporting events, and how the security is different 
inside the stadium versus the surrounding area. This chapter also demonstrates the 
perceived threat of terrorism at non-Super Bowl NFL games, and how the NFL has made 
alterations to its security to protect fans since 9/11 without becoming too intrusive to the 
point of ruining their heretofore successful financial model. 
The fifth chapter deals specifically with the tailgating aspect of security at NFL 
games, and how there is a perceived shortfall in the procedures to protect fans in these 
areas. My analysis here compares and contrasts a portion of the league’s teams and their 
tailgating policies to highlight any specific security shortfalls. 
The concluding chapter compares and contrasts the differences between the 
NFL’s security plan to that of American international airports and EPL soccer. This 
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chapter analyzes the various security schemes, and point out the applicability of measures 
employed in airports and EPL that could be useful to NFL protection. 
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II. AVIATION SECURITY 
Following the catastrophic events on September 11, 2001, the American aviation 
industry made major changes to its security posture that would have rippling effects on 
how people travel. Shortly after 9/11 the “Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA)… was created in November 2011 with a charge to improve and federalize airport 
security at 429 commercial airports (Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 2001).”37 
The aviation industry stood up the TSA in an effort to deter and dissuade terrorists from 
successfully targeting airport facilities and commercial airplanes to protect both their 
passengers and the livelihood of the air travel enterprise. The attacks of 9/11 were not 
viewed as a one-time event, but rather as a wake-up call to the need for greater security. 
There was a perceived existential threat that “suicide bombing has become a real risk to 
civil aviation” in the aftermath of 9/11.38 Measures to mitigate the threat of terrorism 
were important to get right the first time because the economic significance of U.S. air 
travel is “estimated to account for 6%–7% of the nation’s GDP.”39 Security officials 
believed the potential for attacks at airports seemed to be more attractive than many other 
places “since the trend in terrorist attacks has shifted toward inflicting mass casualties.”40 
Terrorists in the planning stage would have many opportunities to attack an airport or a 
flight when accounting for the following: “on a daily basis, thousands of carrier flights 
arrive, depart, or overfly the continental United States.”41 Thus, the aviation industry had 
to make significant changes to its security plans to prevent terrorists from exploiting its 
weaknesses. 
                                                 
37 Konstantina Gkritza, Debbie Niemeier, and Fred Mannering, “Airport Security Screening and 
Changing Passenger Satisfaction: An Exploratory Assessment,” Journal of Air Transport Management 12, 
no. 5 (2006): 213, doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2006.03.001. 
38 Franziska Hofer and Olive E. Wetter, “Operational and Human Factors Issues of New Airport 
Security Technology—Two Case Studies,” Journal of Transportation Security 5, no. 4 (September 2012): 
277, doi:10.1007/s12198-012-0096-5. 
39 Joseph S. Szyliowicz, “Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, 
no. 1 (2004): 47, doi:10.1080/10576100490262160. 
40 Szyliowicz, “Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?,” 47. 
41 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, (Washington, DC: The 
White House, 2007), 6, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=472107. 
 14
The aviation sector has taken a proactive approach to combat terrorist threats, and 
in doing so it can be useful to other industries in developing security approaches against 
such threats. This chapter will discuss the previous shortfalls in aviation security first, 
and then discuss the DHS aviation security strategy as it relates to specific changes in 
security policy, the updated workforce of the TSA, the proliferation of canine patrols, and 
the challenges to security moving forward. The following sections will discuss the 
challenges to aviation security, the debates concerning aviation security effectiveness and 
its high cost, and finally the merits of using whole-body scanners (WBS) in airports. 
A. THE THREAT: TERRORISM, HIJACKING, AND EVERYTHING ELSE 
In the past, the aviation industry had been known to be reactive in its security 
measures. The argument is that the aviation security posture pre-9/11 relied too heavily 
on “guns, guards, and gates,” which gave the industry a false sense of safety against 
attacks.42 In the wake of 9/11, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was shown “to 
be a reactive agency that acted sporadically in ways designed to prevent a specific kind of 
attack that had been carried out in the past.”43 The problem was that the security plan was 
only “developed or adapted to meet each new threat only after manifestation as either a 
planned or actual attack” took place.44 
In the year directly following 9/11, airport security measures changed rapidly in 
how passengers were screened prior to entering the secure areas of the airports. First, the 
“airlines instructed passengers to arrive at airports as much as two hours before takeoff 
for domestic flights,” when in the past that type of recommendation would have been 
deemed unreasonable.45 Second, “passengers were randomly selected for additional 
screening, including hand-searching of their carry-on bags, in the boarding area” after 
                                                 
42 Szyliowicz, “Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?,” 58. 
43 Szyliowicz, “Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?,” 49. 
44 Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Kate Bowers, and Kevin Chetty, “Public Attitudes to Airport Security: 
The Case of Whole Body Scanners,” Security Journal 25, no. 3 (July 2012): 229, doi:10.1057/sj.2011.20. 
45 Garrick Blalock, Vrinda Kadiyali, and Daniel H. Simon, “The Impact of Post9/11 Airport Security 
Measures on the Demand for Air Travel,” The Journal of Law and Economics 50, no. 4 (November 2007): 
733, doi:10.1086/519816. 
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having already been screened to enter the airport’s secure area.46 Third, there were 
numerous restrictions placed on what items could be carried onboard commercial 
airplanes. Some of these restrictions made sense to keep the public safe, such as limiting 
items that could be used as weapons. Some changes, though, were criticized, like the 
restrictions placed on liquid container sizes and other “prohibitions regarding various 
seemingly non-dangerous items such as nail clippers.”47 These changes are not all 
encompassing, as there were other changes in security, such as TSA’s adherence to 
checking each passenger’s baggage and identification information more thoroughly than 
in the past. The changes that took place directly following 9/11 indicate that there were 
several obvious changes that needed to be made rapidly to prevent another major attack. 
In an effort to get away from the reactive approach, the “President’s Commission 
on Critical Infrastructure” in 2003, under George W. Bush, listed the following five 
elements to be explored individually and in relation to each other to devise a more 
encompassing security plan: “Volume”; “Limited capabilities and available space”; 
“Economic sensitivity”; “Security versus convenience and cost”; and lastly 
“Accessibility.”48 Identifying and exploring these elements was important to accurately 
assess how and what security measures would be needed to prevent new attacks; 
however, a proper balance would have to be found because “too stringent security 
impedes flow-through while too lax security opens up the airport to unacceptable threat 
risks.”49 The ultimate goal, though, was to devise a counterterrorism plan in aviation “to 
shape the situation so that in any scenario the outcomes from the terrorist’s point of view 
will be unsatisfactory.”50 
A debate persisted for a few years after 9/11 regarding how much security should 
be reasonably expected at airports. For example, Congress saw the need in 2004 “to 
                                                 
46 Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon, “Impact of Post9/11 Airport Security,” 733. 
47 Blalock, Kadiyali, and Simon, “Impact of Post9/11 Airport Security,” 735. 
48 Szyliowicz, “Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?,” 48. 
49 Alan (Avi) Kirschenbaum, “The Cost of Airport Security: The Passenger Dilemma,” Journal of Air 
Transport Management 30 (2013): 39–40, doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.05.002. 
50 Donald Stevens et al., “Near-Term Options for Improving Security at Los Angeles International 
Airport,” (Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2004), vii. 
 16
improve checkpoint screening technologies capable of detecting explosives,” and tasked 
the TSA to make the appropriate changes.51 Just two years earlier in 2002, though, 
Congress opposed and cut the funding for a proactive project to counter terrorism “called 
Total Information Awareness (TIA),” which was meant “to gather a variety of 
information about people, including financial, educational, health, and other data” to 
anticipate would-be terrorists based on these data and trends.52 Essentially the forces of 
maintaining and introducing security procedures and equipment to prevent terrorism 
based on reactive measures—as opposed to proactive ones—became a norm in the 
aviation industry. 
B. AVIATION SECURITY STRATEGY 
President George W. Bush directed DHS in 2006 to create the first comprehensive 
aviation security strategy for the nation to build on the successful security measures post-
9/11 to include the upgraded security workforce and more stringent security measures.53 
The National Strategy for Aviation Security was released in 2007 with the mission of 
“coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the protection of critical 
infrastructure” for airport security.54 Some of the major changes in strategy post-9/11 
identified in the 2007 Strategy are as follows: “Federal Air Marshalls who fly 
anonymously on commercial passenger aircraft to provide a law enforcement presence; 
enhanced explosives and threat detection technology deployed in hundreds of airports; 
airspace and air traffic management security measures; and a cadre of canine explosives 
detection teams screening baggage, cargo, and increasingly, carry-on items.”55 
Additionally, the identification cards used by passengers are screened against a “terrorist 
                                                 
51 Bart Elias, Changes in Airport Passenger Screening Technologies and Procedures: Frequently 
Asked Questions, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2011), 1. 
52 Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide,” 746. 
53 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 2. 
54 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 13. 
55 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 5–6. 
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watchlist” to quickly assess whether any information is available on a given individual to 
indicate a known threat against the United States.56 
1. Specific Changes in Policy and the Importance of the Air Domain 
The National Strategy for Aviation Security called for a collective effort to 
prevent terrorist attacks through a shared and unified front. The report called for 
“Federal, State, local, and tribal governments” to work closely together “as a force 
multiplier against adversaries.”57 The element of funding and securitizing efforts would 
have to be divided as well through “cost-sharing and burden-sharing between public and 
private sectors.”58 The strategy called for heightened efficiency as well to “provide a high 
degree of protection, while minimizing the impact of the efficient flow of people and 
goods through the system.”59 The efforts would be divided on a case-by-case basis 
depending on what resources were available at each airport and municipality. The 
strategy also called for further security in the public areas of the airport because terrorists 
could attack the airport in the unsecured areas by placing “explosives near or inside 
passenger facilities.”60 The objective of the strategy and collective work of the private 
and public security and funding elements are to “protect the United States and its interests 
in the Air Domain”; “mitigate damage and expedite recovery”; “minimize the impact on 
the Aviation Transportation System and the U.S. economy”; “actively engage domestic 
and international partners.”61 
2. The New Aviation Workforce 
Perhaps the biggest change to aviation security after 9/11 was the standing up of 
TSA under the Department of Homeland Security in the November 2001 with a mission 
of providing more professional and complete security as opposed to the former security 
                                                 
56 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 20. 
57 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 13. 
58 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 15. 
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60 United States White House Office, National Strategy for Aviation Security, 11. 
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apparatus. The American public was generally accepting of the TSA, as well as other 
additional security measures in the wake of 9/11, because passengers viewed terrorism as 
“a frightening threat” to their safety.62 The TSA formed a “replacement of the much-
criticized system of having private contractors provide passenger screening by poorly 
paid, badly trained, and inefficient personnel with a force of 60,000 federal workers.”63 
This new massive federal workforce was in charge of implementing stricter standards of 
security screening through airports across the United States. 
The TSA applied its “21 Layers of Security” to airports to thwart attacks, and “of 
these 21 layers, 15 concern preboarding security” while “the remaining six layers of 
security provide in-flight security.”64 Another major change made was when in 2010 the 
“TSA introduced whole body imaging (WBI) systems at airports around the United 
States.”65 This occurred after the “shoe bomber” incident in December 2001 when 
Richard Reid successfully brought an explosive device in his shoes aboard a flight from 
Paris to Miami with the intent to detonate the device during the flight.66 Another incident 
was in 2009 when “Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to ignite an explosive device 
concealed in his underwear while on board a Detroit-bound commercial flight.”67 Whole-
body scanners and new security measures for screening were implemented to thwart 
terrorist attacks through more thorough screening to prevent terrorists from smuggling 
weapons onto planes on their persons. 
The proliferation of anti-explosives canine patrols is another major change in the 
post-9/11 security of airports. The “TSA, in coordination with state and local law 
enforcement, has, in total, more than 600 explosive detection canine teams.”68 These 
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canine teams are used throughout airports across the United States to specifically detect 
explosive devices. Canines are primarily used in the unsecured areas of airports while 
“inspecting cargo and baggage and patrolling airport terminals.”69 The deterrent of these 
roving canine patrols is considered to be helpful to dissuading terrorists from bringing 
explosive devices into airports because people have realized that “the use of bomb-
sniffing dogs also became commonplace” in the years following 9/11.70 There have been 
some problems surrounding the use of canine patrols, though, because some individuals 
“have a fear of or allergies to dogs,” while another major concern relates to “religious and 
cultural sensitivities regarding the use of dogs to search individuals.”71 These issues 
cannot easily be fixed since certain cultural and societal negative feelings as related to the 
use of canine patrols are likely to persist. 
C.  CHALLENGES TO AVIATION SECURITY TODAY 
There were many challenges that the aviation industry had to deal with to prevent 
attacks to include accounting for the international aviation standards, tracking and 
profiling people, balancing speed and security, and identifying all potential attack types. 
First, the “International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), with some 184 member 
states, has attempted to deal with the issue of security by establishing overall 
standards.”72 Many of these standards were “considered by experts to establish, at best, a 
minimum, not especially stringent, standard.”73 The problem was that “passengers 
arriving at a global airport may have boarded anywhere, the global aviation security 
system is hostage to the least secure airport.”74 Second, many travelers are uncomfortable 
with the notion of tracking and profiling passengers. The issue of profiling has become 
“highly controversial” because many believe that classifying people based on physical, 
cultural, ethnic, or religious grounds is unjust and “passenger profiling and behavioral 
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detection has been discussed prominently in the mass media,” which has garnered further 
negative response.75 The tracking portion is achieved through the use of various 
identification cards for passengers to gain entrance into the secured areas of airports.76 
The third challenge to airport security is to maintain a proper balance between 
protecting their customers and maintaining a relatively hassle-free screening process. The 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) stated that screening time standards are 
“‘best’ at one person per 15 s [seconds], ‘average’ about 25 s per passenger and ‘worst’ at 
60 s per passenger.”77 Maintaining the lower end of passengers per second spectrum is 
important because “the security ‘hassle factor’ may drive would-be passengers to 
consider other alternatives.”78 The screening, in essence, should work such that people 
feel safe at airports while not having to spend excessive time in the security lines. 
1. The LAX Methodology 
Fourth, and most importantly, the aviation sector must identify the many ways 
airports can be attacked and to provide adequate countermeasures for each method. The 
Rand Corporation’s study of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) demonstrates a 
methodology for analyzing LAX, which can generally be applied to other airports both 
large and small. The LAX case study identified the numerous ways terrorists can attack 
airports to include curbside truck and car bombs, or an attack by terrorists armed with 
bombs or guns in a congested area to inflict “the largest loss of life.”79 To counter the 
threat of car bombs, the study called for a rapid “examination of vehicles entering the 
airport.”80 The study calls for adding security lanes to quickly search vehicles entering 
the airport, while officers may “direct large vehicles to a remote lot in an attempt to 
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prevent vehicles capable of carrying the largest bombs” to be anywhere near congested 
areas.81 To counter the likelihood of bombings or armed attacks within the airports 
crowded spaces, the study called more staff at key positions to more rapidly check-in 
passengers that can “reduce the density of people within the terminals.”82  
The LAX study showed that in some cases “increasing the number of personnel 
checking-in passengers by 5 percent we can reduce the density of people in the lobbies 
and on the curb by 75 percent and the potential fatalities to luggage bombs by 80 
percent.”83 The lessons from the LAX case study show that the most important 
countermeasures are to reduce the crowd density on a case-by-case basis to limit a mass 
gathering of people as possible, and analyze weaknesses to attacks and implement 
effective counter measures. 
2. The Debate about Aviation Security Effectiveness 
The security posture implemented in the aviation sector is typically believed to 
create more safety to the industry on a whole, but there is an argument that the additional 
measures have in some ways been counterproductive. For instance, since 9/11 “terrorist 
groups continue to try to attack harder targets with different modes of attack, including 
with suicide bombers.”84 Additional security measures have prompted terrorists to try to 
find different ways to make successful attacks, and the measures have perhaps even made 
airports a more attractive target because attacking a hardened target shows both resolve 
and will on the terrorists’ part. It can be argued that hardening a target “actually increases 
the expected value of attacking a target… even if the attack is more likely to fail” because 
the attack will garner greater media coverage while displaying that no sites or security 
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measures will interrupt the intended chaos of a given terrorist organization.85 If the 
purpose of that terrorist attack is to demonstrate that no one should feel safe, then 
attacking hardened targets will underscore that message. 
Another argument for why terrorist groups may continue to attempt attacks is 
because each attempt will produce greater security measures, which will cost the U.S. 
government a tremendous amount of money. To display how costly aviation security 
increases were following the attacks of 9/11, in “FY [Fiscal Year] 2004, the TSA is 
requesting a total of about $5 billion, $1.8 billion of which is allocated to passenger 
screening.”86 Each unsuccessful attack since then has created new measures of security 
and manning requirements that has increased the relative annual budget to secure 
American airports. Therefore, terrorist groups can benefit just by a threat of attack and 
induce costly defensive security measures, which can be argued to be more valuable than 
“a plot to kill people would.”87 
D. THE PASSENGER EXPERIENCE 
One of the most significant changes to aviation security since 9/11 has been the 
employment of whole-body scanners, otherwise known as Advanced Imagining 
Technology (AIT), to phase out conventional walk-through metal detectors at airports 
throughout the United States. The new machines use “X-ray backscatter” or “millimeter 
wave imaging” to detect any weapons or contraband on the person passing into the 
secured areas of a given airport.88 
While the new technologically superior WBS machines have almost completely 
phased out the former conventional machines, there are several issues surrounding their 
usage including WBS functionality, passenger acceptance, cultural complaints, legal 
considerations, operator biases, and health concerns. Beyond the previously listed issues, 
the machines are extremely expensive. From 2008–2009 alone, more than $500 million 
                                                 
85 Hastings and Chan, “Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling,” 778. 
86 Szyliowicz, “Aviation Security: Promise or Reality?,” 52. 
87 Hastings and Chan, “Target Hardening and Terrorist Signaling,” 790. 
88 Elias, Changes in Airport Passenger Screening Technologies and Procedures, 2. 
 23
dollars was spent in the United States to purchase WBS machines for its airports.89 
Another issue is that these machines are massive and “require two to three times the floor 
space” as compared to the machines they have replaced.90 Thus, airports have been 
forced to balance this WBS security measure against cost and space considerations. 
1. Whole Body Scanning Usefulness  
The first question surrounding WBS technologies is what do these machines 
detect and how well do they work? Whole-body scanners are used to identify “metallic 
and non-metallic objects, plastic and liquid explosives, flora, fauna, drugs, and cash, 
concealed within or beneath the clothing of passengers” as they pass through the 
machines into the secured area of airports.91 The division for airport security is confident 
that WBS/AIT machines are adequate in thoroughly screening passengers: “TSA 
generally regards AIT as an effective solution for detecting concealed threats carried by 
passengers.”92 Additionally, all “approved AIT systems in use at airports have met TSA’s 
operational requirements for threat detection.”93 
There is an argument to be made that some items could conceivably go 
undetected in passing through WBS systems, though. Some security experts believed that 
“even if exposure were to be increased significantly, normal anatomy would make a 
dangerous amount of plastic explosives with tapered edges difficult if not impossible to 
detect” on people wishing to conceal such devices.94 At the time of this writing there 
have been no reported cases of plastic explosives going undetected into the secured area 
of airports to be used for an attack in the airport or on a flight. 
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2. Passenger Acceptance of Whole Body Scanning Technologies 
The second question revolving around the proliferation of WBS technologies is 
how well will the public accept these security systems? The hassle of passing through 
WBS systems is that “passengers are typically instructed to remove all metallic items, 
including cell phones, keys, coins, and sometimes even jewelry and belts with metal 
buckles” and they are “required to remove their shoes.”95 Since all passengers have to 
take everything out of their pockets and take off their shoes, screening is often perceived 
as burdensome, and lines can back up significantly depending on how fast each 
individual in the line is at preparing to go through the machine. 
Another concern for the individual is that “whole body scanners have been 
accused of conducting digital strip-searches” because the sensitivity required to 
display abnormalities such as hidden weapons also reveals the physical outline of 
the individual underneath the clothing to a high level of detail.96 Following the 
widespread implementation of WBS technologies across the United States, enough 
passengers have complained about the amount of detail the machines showed about their 
physical characteristics that the machines’ detecting abilities have been decreased. The 
specific measures that were altered are that WBS machines now “blur facial features,” 
and the TSA “views the images in an enclosed space” that only displays a “chalk outline” 
of the passenger to detect abnormalities.97 
3. Legal and Cultural Concerns of WBS Technologies in Aviation 
The legal considerations about WBS screening have been another concern 
revolving around the introduction of the new technologies. The primary legal question 
was whether or not the screening process at airports in using WBS technologies is 
contradictory to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution relating to the 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This issue has not yet been ruled on in the Supreme 
Court, but the “9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that airport searches of passengers are 
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reasonable and do not require consent” since the search is “known as an administrative 
search” and not covered under Fourth Amendment.98 The argument of the court is that 
passengers after 9/11 were willfully accepting the search process by deciding to pass 
through the security lines at an airport, and also that the protection of all people 
at an airport outweighs the inconvenience caused to the individual in being digitally 
searched. Therefore, “the courts have ruled that passenger airport screening is a 
reasonable cost that Americans must pay to prevent death, injury and property damage 
from terrorist attacks.”99 
Whole-body scanners were also argued to be in violation of legal protections in 
the United States for religious and cultural practices. Because the new scanning 
technologies do not allow exceptions for what type of dress people wear through the 
detectors, such as when “certain religions and cultures sometimes require individuals to 
wear head coverings in public,” some groups believe the TSA is singling them out.100 For 
this reason, the scanners are considered by some to “violate the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, which bars the government from placing substantial burden on a 
person’s exercise of religion.”101 
Additionally, the TSA operators who use WBS technologies for safeguarding the 
airports have the task of analyzing the people and items that transit into the secured areas 
of airports, which introduces the element of human error in effectively using the 
machines. Therefore, WBS “devices do not work on their own but in a context where 
human operators determine vast parts of operations, any ‘neutrality’ will fail to be 
delivered if the human operators do not relinquish their own ‘risk profiling.’”102 
                                                 
98 Elias, Changes in Airport Passenger Screening Technologies and Procedures, 6. 
99 Thomas W. Dillon and Daphyne S. Thomas, “Airport Body Scanning: Will the American Public 
Finally Accept?,” Journal of Transportation Security 8, no. 1–2 (November 2014): 2. 
100 Elias, Changes in Airport Passenger Screening Technologies and Procedures, 7. 
101 Dillon and Thomas, “Airport Body Scanning,” 3. 
102 Govert Valkenburg and Irma Van der Ploeg, “Materialities between Security and Privacy: A 
Constructivist Account of Airport Security Scanners,” Security Dialogue 46, no. 4 (July 2015): 339, 
doi:10.1177/0967010615577855. 
 26
4. Passenger X-Ray Exposure Health Concerns 
The use of X-ray machines has created a potential health concern for all airline 
passengers. The technology is argued to provide “some X-ray photons” that “still 
penetrate the subject’s body delivering a radiation dose” that could create health-related 
issues.103 A study conducted by “faculty members from the University of California, San 
Francisco” claims that X-ray backscatter is dangerous because it is “concentrated only on 
the skin and underlying tissue, such that ‘the dose to the skin may be dangerously high’” 
for anyone subjected to the technology.104 
There is a debate as to whether or not the x-ray backscatter is inherently unsafe to 
passengers. The “TSA contends that the levels of ionizing radiation emitted by approved 
X-ray backscatter systems are well below levels considered safe for human exposure” 
and that the amount of x-ray exposure to passengers is the same amount received during 
“two minutes flying at altitude aboard a commercial airliner.”105 The TSA is not alone in 
discounting the radiation levels passed to participants of WBS technologies though as the 
“Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Devices and Radiological Heath, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Johns Hopkins University 
Applied Physics Laboratory” have also approved these systems by claiming the x-ray 
exposures to use is negligible.106 
5. Pat-Down Screening versus WBS Technologies 
Passengers that opt out of screening via the use of WBS systems can choose the 
pat-down method instead to access the secured areas of airports. Since 9/11, the pat-down 
method has become more intrusive because the procedure has changed from TSA agents 
“only using the back of their hands while inspecting sensitive areas” to “using the front of 
the hand” during inspections to include the areas “higher on the thigh and in the groin 
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area.”107 This new pat-down method has created further negative response from 
passengers for the screening process at airports. 
Specifically, TSA has received negative publicity for “singling out female 
passengers” for pat-downs; however, TSA has created further training for its agents to 
standardize the pat-down method to eliminate excessive passenger complaints and 
concerns.108 Most passengers prefer using WBS systems though as there is a “high public 
acceptance of body scanners (>90 per cent) and a strong preference for them over 
pat-downs (>80 per cent) with scanners perceived as less intrusive than pat-downs and 
a quicker option.”109 Additionally, the “AIT screening is much quicker and more 
efficient than a pat-down search” that saves time for both passengers and security 
personnel alike.110 
E. CONCLUSION 
The American aviation sector has made multiple changes to its security 
procedures since 9/11. Most of these changes occurred within five years of the attacks. 
As a result of the changes—such as the numerous limitations placed on what could be 
carried on passengers or in their baggage, additional canine patrols, the start of TSA, 
unified security standards for the industry, and WBS scanning technologies—American 
airports and planes have not been the victim of successful large-scale attacks since 2001. 
The only attacks that have been successfully executed on U.S. soil since 9/11, such as the 
shooting attacks at LAX in 2002 and 2013, are considered small scale in that they 
resulted in very few—only a total of four—deaths. 
The threat to the industry does persist, though. The 2016 attacks in Brussels and 
Istanbul international airports demonstrates that even the relatively secure pre-security 
areas of airports can be successfully targeted by terrorists wishing to kill as many people 
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as possible. While no notable changes to America’s international airports have been 
revealed publically in the wake of these attacks, it is highly likely that American aviation 
security decision makers will analyze the attacks in Europe to ensure that no similar type 
of attacks happen on U.S. soil. 
The changes to American aviation security can be useful in our analysis of the 
overall thesis question of whether the NFL is adequately protected from terrorist attacks. 
The aviation sector has introduced a central security team, the TSA, to perform and carry 
out security measures in airports across the country. Would it be helpful for the NFL to 
also have a similar professional security team to protect its games? Such a centralized and 
professional security force could be better able to thwart terrorism efforts through its 
training protocols. Another factor is aviation’s use of WBS technologies to screen 
passengers entering the secured areas of airports. Would using WBS technologies to 
screen NFL fans entering the stadiums be beneficial and make the area more secure? 
Clearly, WBS is superior to the use of conventional metal detectors, like those used at 
NFL games, but the space limitations at stadiums may prohibit NFL franchises from 
using this technology. 
 29
III. ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE 
The English professional soccer league system is divided into four divisions, the 
highest level of which is called the English Premier League. The EPL has become the 
second largest professional sports league in the world in terms of net worth after the 
National Football League.111 The growth of the EPL since its inception has been 
astronomical; its “annual revenues multiplied by around 12 times from 1991 to 2009.”112 
The success of the EPL was not guaranteed following a rough spell in the 1980s 
that was marked by both large-scale accidents and hooliganism. The league survived this 
period to become the most successful professional soccer league in the world by making 
changes to promote fan safety and security at matches while building club rosters to 
ensure high-quality play. As a result of the changes since the mid-1980s, the EPL was 
able to land a massive deal with Sky television that enhanced the popularity of the 
sport.113 Consequently, the EPL had a “built-in media interest in working to promote the 
positive image of English football”—to include securing fans and facilities.114 After 
years of security success at matches, the EPL in the 2015 season boasted an average of 
30,000+ fans per match for 13 of its 20 clubs, and nine of those clubs had at least 500,000 
fans attend home games that year.115 
When comparing the EPL to the NFL, it is important to consider that different 
“counter-terrorist strategies hold substantively different meanings across different 
nationalities.”116 Nonetheless, some of the EPL’s protective measures could be applied to 
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NFL stadiums. In this chapter I will demonstrate how the EPL survived the hard years to 
become one of the most powerful sporting leagues in the world through reforms to 
prevent violence at matches, as well as a strict adherence to safety in general. 
The first section discusses the similarities that hooliganism has to terrorism and 
the subsequent need to mitigate this threat, highlighting specific accidents in the 1980s 
that led to soccer security reforms. The following section explains all aspects relating to 
the league’s security strategy to include examining all relevant safety and security 
manuals, describing the various security roles and their relationships among each other, 
describing how intelligence and security measures are used to protect fans, outlining the 
various Football Banning Orders to keep hooligans out of soccer stadiums, and 
describing the various fan screening procedures. Next, I describe the challenges facing 
the league today by demonstrating that terrorist threats to the EPL and the U.K. are real, 
as indicated by the 2005 London bombings and the 2015 Paris attacks. The subsequent 
section analyzes the fans’ experience in attending EPL soccer matches, and how their 
experience is affected by the league’s overall security scheme. The final section 
concludes with my findings and analysis. 
A. THE THREAT: HOOLIGANISM 
Many of the EPL’s reforms have been established since the 1980s to reduce the 
threat of hooligan violence at matches. Hooliganism previously had devastating 
consequences on the fan turnout in English soccer and was “blamed for declining 
attendance at English football from the 1960s to the mid-1980s.”117 The problem initially 
was that typical soccer fans would not attend matches because of their belief “that 
attending the game is not safe.”118 
Major incidents in Great Britain and abroad seared the perception of soccer 
attendance as dangerous into the popular imagination. First, at a game abroad in Heysel 
Stadium, Liverpool English hooligans attacked Italian fans during the “Liverpool-
Juventus European Cup final in Brussels in 1985, where 39 fans of the Italian club were 
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killed due to crowd-crushing, after seeking to escape attacks by English supporters.”119 
The result was devastating, embarrassing, and crippling to the reputation of English 
soccer. Additionally, the attack in Brussels at Heysel Stadium caused English soccer to 
be banned from participating in future playoff competitions for five years.120 
The Bradford City stadium fire in 1985 started when a “cigarette or match fell 
through the boards into the void underneath the stand and set fire to a large amount of 
rubbish,” which spread rapidly and killed 56 fans at the match.121 This disaster 
demonstrated the inadequacy of safety training for the stewarding staff, otherwise known 
as security staff; the stewards left their turnstiles and exits “locked and unmanned,” 
which contributed to a large number of the deaths.122 Along with the Heysel Stadium 
incident, the Bradford Stadium fire contributed to declining numbers of fans attending 
matches, and the league suffered from its worst-ever attendance rates.123 
Then during “the Hillsborough disaster of 1989… 96 fans were crushed to death” 
because the police at the game were unable to control the crowd’s surge.124 This accident 
occurred shortly after kick-off between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, when “an exit 
gate was opened to relieve a large crush that had developed outside the turnstiles at one 
end of the stadium.”125 The problem became dangerous when too many fans filtered into 
a small area, which was “compartmentalized by radial barriers on either side and by a 
steel perimeter fence at the front.”126 Fans were unable to escape once trapped because 
“the barriers and the perimeter fence prevented any sideways or forward movement to 
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escape the crush,” which resulted in the massive death toll from a combination of both 
crowd-crushing and asphyxiation.127 
In the face of these three disasters, professional soccer managers in England 
undertook to provide more training for their staff to control the movement of people and 
to design stadiums that can rapidly exit their fans without the inherent risk of crowd 
crushing. Additional measures were enacted to prevent hooliganism at matches. The 
measures to prevent hooliganism and loss of life at matches—better staff training, 
Football Banning Orders (FBOs), and better safety features in stadium designs—also 
lowered the likelihood of terrorism because they were all tailored to prevent violence at 
matches through a strict adherence to safety and security. By end of the 1980s, English 
soccer began making dramatic changes to provide adequate safety and security to its fans 
that safeguarded the league from crumbling under its own security inadequacies. 
Some scholars have made the argument that hooligan tactics and violence were 
similar to those of terrorists, such as in the following example: “hooligans are ‘no 
different from terrorists’, because they ‘carry participation to its tragic limit, while at the 
same time daring the State to respond with violence, to liquidate them.’”128 
The British government took the hooligan threat seriously, undertaking “proactive 
measures to use legislation, doctrine, and technology to prevent and combat it as it would 
for any other form of terrorism.”129 The U.K. intelligence community also considered 
hooliganism to be a major threat. As a result, the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
was created in 1992 to gather information on hooligans to prevent them from entering 
games.130 
                                                 
127 Whalley, “Stadium Safety Management in England.” 
128 Richard Giulianotti and Francisco Klauser, “Sport Mega-Events and ‘Terrorism’: A Critical 
Analysis,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 47, no. 3 (June 2012): 315, 
doi:10.1177/1012690211433454. 
129 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” 25. 
130 Giulianotti, “Sport Mega Events, Urban Football Carnivals,” 3301. 
 33
B. EPL SECURITY STRATEGY 
The EPL’s Security Strategy incorporates elements to protect fans from 
hooligans, terrorists, or accidents that could cause loss of life or injuries at games. In this 
section, I discuss these elements of the EPL’s Security Strategy in the use of various 
security doctrines, security personnel, intelligence agencies, security technologies, and 
fan screening. 
1. Safety and Security Manuals Used by the EPL 
The EPL has altered its safety and security by applying the methods of the Guide 
to Safety at Sports Grounds manual (commonly referred to as the Green Guide) 
published by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Counter 
Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Stadia and Arenas guide produced by the 
British National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) provides teams with 
minimum security procedures and guidance. These manuals outline how the league 
should “prepare and plan in order to effectively respond and recover from potential 
incidents during sporting events.”131 
The Green Guide outlines various safety regulations that new stadiums must 
adhere to, and that older stadiums must—and have been—retrofitted to, with the 
following subsections defining the exact specifications to be considered: “The entry 
capacity of the section”; “The holding capacity of the section”; “The exit capacity of the 
section”; “The emergency evacuation capacity”; “The final capacity.”132 The safety 
alterations for all stadiums have been completely implemented. In fact, “Since 1990, of 
the 20 largest English stadia, eight were newly built in 1995 or afterwards and the others 
underwent major redevelopment.”133 The distance for fans to reach the nearest exits was 
also regulated as “the maximum travel distance for seated spectators is 30m from the seat 
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to the nearest exit,” while the “emergency evacuation time varies between two and half 
minutes and eight minutes, according to the level of fire risk.”134 The reduced distances 
to reach the nearest exit have helped to lessen the threat of a stampede of fans rushing to 
exits in emergency situations, such as during a terrorist attack, which can cause crushing 
and trampling situations. 
The NaCTSO manual is used to prevent terrorism at matches, and it is specifically 
“aimed at those stadia and arenas that are seeking to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack, 
or limit the damage terrorism might cause.”135 The DCMS manual on the other hand “has 
become the safety ‘bible’ in the [U.K.], setting out guidance on all aspects of stadium 
safety.”136 Both manuals provide guidance to club managers for the safety and security of 
fans at matches, but neither manual had to be adopted for use legally by the league. 
Nonetheless, each manual has been adopted for use by all clubs within the EPL, and the 
requirements therein are strictly adhered to. The Green Guide does, however, correspond 
with U.K. legal requirements under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act of 1975 and the 
Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act of 1987.137 Both manuals provide certain 
thresholds regarding staff training necessary to curtail terrorist attacks, as well as the 
physical characteristics necessary in stadium design considerations to limit death and 
injuries to fans and staff. 
To mitigate the effects of car-bomb attacks, NaCTSO advises the EPL stadium 
managers to have barriers placed around the stadium to “keep non-essential vehicles at 
least 30 metres from your building.”138 To reduce the number of vehicles travelling 
within close vicinity of the stadium “a number of local roads around the perimeter of the 
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Stadium are closed two hours before kick off.”139 Screening procedures of persons, to 
include pat-downs and metal wanding, are used to prevent bombs from entering the 
stadium. 
2. Club Managers Are in Charge of Overall Safety and Security 
The responsibility for safety and security at EPL matches falls directly to the 
management for individual clubs. Regardless of the situation, whether an attack, an 
accident, or a natural disaster occurs at an event, the “responsibility for the safety of 
spectators lies at all times with the ground management,” which is “either the owner or 
lessee of the ground, who may not necessarily be the promoter of the event.”140 As a 
result, the club managers were tasked with creating specific plans for the security of fans 
and to promote safety at soccer games. 
Club managers use the security manuals to assess and execute the following 
elements to achieve proper security at games: “risk communication protocol”; “mutual-
aid agreements”; “coordination with other organisations to provide mass care”; “mass 
evacuation and traffic-control coordination”; and “conversion of the sport facility to a 
shelter facility in a time of crisis.”141 Clubs in the EPL have taken their responsibility for 
fan safety seriously by not only adhering to the Green Guide and NaCTSO’s Counter 
Terrorism manual, but also by providing the “necessary resources to recruit and train 
event staff and security forces to understand their roles and responsibilities in response to 
all-hazard incidents.”142 
3. EPL Safety and Security Chain of Command 
The EPL has set clearly defined roles for members of its security team, whereby 
the team’s safety officer is overall in charge of security and receives threat assessments 
from the intelligence officer. Depending on the threat assessment’s findings, the team’s 
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safety officer will then assign the proper number of stewards to monitor and respond to 
safety issues as defined by the safety officer and the security plan. The stewards, or 
stewarding staff, at EPL games are the professional security staff hired by individual 
teams. The safety and security of fans at matches is predicated on having a clear and well 
thought-out chain of command that is headed by the safety officer for each club. The 
safety officer before each match is responsible for “the implementation of protective 
security measures following a vulnerability and risk assessment.”143 To prepare 
adequately for games, the safety officer creates pre-planned responses to attacks or 
accidents.144 Additionally, the safety officer ensures that all staff members are properly 
trained and understand their specific responsibilities and actions in response to different 
threats.145 The high burden of responsibility placed on the safety officer made it 
necessary to have a deputy to help manage safety at EPL matches, and the deputy must 
have “sufficient training, experience, and knowledge” to properly assist the safety 
officer.146 
The safety officer will make efforts to decrease the likelihood of attacks through 
proper security manning. Security measures by “football clubs and the police have 
focused on prevention, primarily through the segregation of fans, increased surveillance, 
and heavy policing,” which have helped to prevent major incidents since the 1980s.147 
The safety officer of individual teams often works closely with public law enforcement 
entities in devising specific plans for the associated stadium. The safety officer can rely 
on local police and public intelligence agencies “for independent and impartial counter 
terrorism advice and guidance that is site specific,” and he will have direct access to “the 
local police Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA).”148 
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Soccer clubs in the EPL also utilize internal intelligence teams to help assess the 
threat of terrorism or hooliganism at matches, and they report all relevant findings to the 
safety officer. The majority of teams “have a full-time Football Intelligence Officer 
dedicated to them who has the role to ‘direct, collate, evaluate, analyse and disseminate 
intelligence.’”149 
The largest faction of security personnel at matches is the stewarding staff, 
typically with “one [steward] per 100 of the anticipated attendance,” and the stewards are 
responsible to monitor the crowd, remain highly visible to answer questions and address 
safety concerns, exercise their actions learned through training in specific emergency 
situations, and maintain the proper qualifications as defined by the Green Guide.150 The 
number of stewards varies between roughly 100–1,000 per match depending on the scope 
of the match, the size of the crowd, and the current threat assessment.151 Fans are told to 
report any suspicious or violent activity to the stewards at games, which helps to provide 
a feeling of safety and security to the spectators.152 
a. Individual Clubs Tailor their Own Safety and Security Measures 
Individual clubs are responsible for the safety and security of their fans, so each 
club can go above and beyond the guidelines set in the Green Guide and NaCTSO’s 
Counter Terrorism Protective Security Advice for Stadia and Arenas. Because each club 
has different stadium configurations and attendances at its matches, “the Board of 
Directors of every football club is therefore ultimately responsible for all safety matters 
and it would be considered good practice for each football club to have a director with 
responsibility for stadium safety.”153 
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Manchester United—which has the largest stadium and the highest average 
attendance per match of any EPL club—has taken extra precautions to protect its fans at 
matches. Manchester United’s management decided to purchase “an industrial estate next 
to its Old Trafford stadium because of fears of a terrorist attack” to create a buffer zone 
from a potential attack emanating from outside.154 The club’s management believed an 
attack against Manchester United is relatively likely due to its prominence in the league 
and the team’s huge attendance rates, so it acquired the adjacent property to serve as a 
buffer zone to reduce the likelihood of an attack by “Al Qaeda or whoever launching 
mortar rockets into the stadium when there are 77,000 fans in there.”155 This effort by 
Manchester United to reduce a specific terrorist threat demonstrates how the league’s 
most prominent club is investing to protect its fans, while maintaining the highest 
attendance numbers per match. 
b. Management Defines Police Role at Matches 
While management is solely responsible for the security of fans at matches, there 
is an important private/public partnership that clubs must exercise to best alleviate seams 
that terrorists or hooligans can exploit. Individual teams are tasked to create a “regular 
liaison with the local authority and the police and emergency services” to protect their 
fans.156 As mandated by law, managers must pay for public agency services at matches, 
and those services are only provided “at the invitation of the host club.”157 Individual 
clubs enjoy greater levels of safety and security at events by employing various public 
entities, such as police and fire services. Additionally, public entities can provide further 
insight to managers in protecting fans during certain situations while maintaining 
“reasonable safety standards.”158 
                                                 
154 Patrick Clift, “Man Utd Shoots for Shed Site amid Terrorist Fears,” The Estates Gazette, March 8, 
2008, 41. 
155 Clift, “Man Utd Shoots for Shed Site,” 41. 
156 “Stadium Safety in the National League System,” 7. 
157 “Summary of Measures Taken to Prevent Football Violence.” 
158 Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, 25. 
 39
Despite having the ultimate authority to enforce law in society, in soccer stadiums 
the role of police is subservient to team managers and the safety officer. The various 
public entities invited to attend matches can make specific recommendations to 
management on how to secure matches, but “it is up to the owner or lessee of the stadium 
to seek out and act upon that advice.”159 
The reasons for this situation have as much to do with public relations as with 
security. The use of police at matches has received some negative criticism due to the 
perceived unfair and unjust treatment of fans. The problem is that the number of police 
officers present at times has been greater than the need, which can cause issues 
specifically when the police face a “high-profile in low-risk scenarios” at games.160 For 
example, in 2009 “four Sunderland fans received hospital treatment for injuries 
(including serious head wounds) caused by police batons and dogs during a confrontation 
at Newcastle station.”161 During this event, “the police claimed that they were preventing 
pre-arranged violence between ‘risk’ Sunderland and Newcastle fans—a claim 
vigorously disputed by the Sunderland supporters.”162 
Club managers will use events like these as learning tools to further analyze and 
organize the roles and responsibilities of police at matches to ensure this type of event 
does not become a regular occurrence and in effort to maintain the league’s good 
standing regarding safety and security at games. 
4. Security Measures and Intelligence 
Security at matches now incorporates the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) 
systems, which have helped security teams to simultaneously watch all fans and areas 
within and surrounding the stadium from their control rooms. The use of CCTV, and 
FBOs for that matter, have made it easier for the security team to rapidly “identify those 
engaged in disorderly behavior, while changes in the law made it easier to exclude known 
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perpetrators from stadiums.”163 Security officials “in addition to [using] CCTV systems,” 
can monitor fans by employing “camera-equipped police van[s]” and plain clothed police 
officers to watch for hooligans.164 Additionally, the league uses several FBOs to prohibit 
hooligans from attending matches. 
From the control room during EPL games, the safety officer can monitor all 
CCTV cameras and security communications throughout the stadium.165 Also stationed 
in the control rooms during games are some police officers, fire fighters, and screen 
monitors to help assist the safety officer in responding the different threats or 
accidents.166 The security and intelligence measures used at EPL matches help to 
mitigate the threat of attacks because the entire inside and outside of the stadium is being 
monitored in real time, and the effective command and control scheme used helps the 
security team to rapidly respond to emergencies. 
a. Football Banning Orders 
The FBOs have been hugely successful in limiting the number of violent offenses 
due to hooliganism. Since the beginning of FBOs in the mid-1980s, studies have 
demonstrated a “clear association between this increasing number of FBOs and the 
decreasing number of serious incidents of ‘hooliganism.’”167 The first of many acts was 
the Public Order Act of 1986, which was used in “preventing convicted fans from 
attending specific games in England and Wales.”168 This act reduced the likelihood of 
hooligans from becoming repeat offenders, because it became difficult for them to access 
tickets and attend matches. 
Next was the Football Spectators Act of 1989, which limited the ability for 
convicted fans to travel abroad while their team plays overseas.169 This act limited the 
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likelihood of another Heysel Stadium-like disaster by allowing “the courts to ban fans 
from a stadium and to require an individual to surrender his passport if suspected of being 
a hooligan likely to travel to a game being played overseas.”170 
The subsequent FBO was the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, 
which allowed for police officers more legal flexibility to stop and search fans.171 This 
act lowered the legal threshold for police to search fans attending a soccer match, which 
helped to further reduce the probability that fans could bring weapons or contraband to 
games undetected. Another act that created more legal leeway to prevent hooligans from 
attending matches was the Football (Disorder) Act of 2000, “which allowed for the 
imposition of FBOs in the absence of a criminal conviction.”172 This law provided more 
legal flexibility to the police and courts in preventing specific fans from entering 
stadiums. 
Finally, the Violent Crime Reduction Act of 2006 allowed for police to act in a 
more proactive manner to curtail potential “alcohol-related offences,” while also allowing 
the EPL to maintain FBOs on fans indefinitely.173 This act allowed for FBOs to remain in 
place for specific fans indefinitely, which meant that certain fans would not be allowed to 
attend EPL matches at home or abroad. 
The introduction of the various FBOs met some criticisms from various people 
and organizations, as some are against the notion of the FBOs’ “pragmatic justification of 
‘the end justifies the means.’”174 The power vested in the various FBOs has been argued 
to be unjust because not only are the police allowed more leeway at matches to search 
fans without cause, but courts are allowed to prevent fans from travelling out of the 
country during soccer matches. In some cases, the exercises of the various FBOs “were 
widely criticized as disproportionate.”175 The primary argument for the disproportionality 
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of fan sentencing was that “the police did not have sufficient evidence to secure a 
criminal conviction.”176 
The Football Spectators Act of 1989 has been directly criticized for preventing 
certain fans from travelling during matches, which are “potential breaches of Articles 5 
and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the EC Treaty.”177 
Nonetheless, the EPL believes the various FBOs have created a safer atmosphere at 
matches, and the league still enjoys remarkably high attendance rates for its 20 clubs. 
b. Stadium Entrance Procedures 
The entry procedures for fans at EPL matches are flexible based on the perceived 
threat level in pregame intelligence analysis, the size of the crowd, and the magnitude of 
the match. Typically, the turnstiles at games open approximately 90 minutes prior to the 
game’s start, which allows an adequate amount of time for staff to properly search fans 
entering the stadium.178 Fans are filtered through the security lines and patted-down and 
scanned using a metal wand prior to reaching the inside of the stadium. Fans that opt out 
of the pat-down and wanding procedure are denied game admission by members of 
management and the security staff.179 In cases where there is a need for heightened 
security at a match due to higher terrorism or hooliganism threats, club management will 
increase the “deployment of additional resources on the approaches to the turnstiles or 
entry points, which in turn may reduce the rate at which spectators can enter.”180 
Convicted hooligans are less likely to be able to attend matches because they must 
provide photo identification at the time of ticket purchases and “most EPL [games] 
require fans to pre-purchase tickets (thereby having passed through forms of anti-
hooligan dataveillance).”181 Certain clubs allow for small bags to be carried into the 
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stadium “as long as they can fit underneath your seat without causing an obstruction to 
the walkway,” although only after the bag is searched by security personnel.182 
C. CHALLENGES TO EPL SECURITY TODAY 
The EPL could be entering a new era of threats from terrorists, as opposed to the 
nearly absent threat of hooligans. The NaCTSO warns that soccer matches serve as an 
attractive target for terrorist attacks because they are considered “symbolic locations” and 
an attack could create numerous deaths because many view these locations as “‘soft’ 
targets.”183 The counter terrorism guide warns specifically that EPL games could be 
vulnerable to bombing attacks because the assailants have several options of carrying an 
explosive device to the stadium: “suicide bombers may use a lorry, plane or other kind of 
vehicle as a bomb or may conceal explosives on their person.”184 
Certainly England has been the target of several terrorist attacks over the years 
from the Irish Republican Army (IRA), but also in attacks on 7 July 2005 (these attacks 
are typically referred to as 7/7). The attacks on 7/7 were devastating, as “four suicide 
bombings…caused the deaths of 52 people and injured more than 950, many seriously” 
with another failed terrorist attack occurring later in the same month.185 The 7/7 
bombings pushed former Prime Minister Tony Blair to create new counterterrorism 
measures that were similar to some of the FBO measures, and “each came at considerable 
cost to the liberties of both individuals and groups of people.”186 
Fast-forward 10 years to Paris, where members of ISIS attacked the Stade de 
France Stadium and other public places, which resulted in over a hundred deaths. The 
EPL responded to the Paris attacks by adding security measures at events. One such 
measure was when Manchester City used additional police forces to create “a ‘ring of 
steel’ round Old Trafford and the Etihad stadiums… to reassure worried football fans this 
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weekend in the wake of the Paris attacks.”187 Following Paris, the league decided to 
increase security measures at games by opening the gates to the stadiums earlier than 
normal to allow for more thorough security checks for fans.188 The league has remained 
on a higher security status since the Paris attacks. The EPL will likely continue its 
increased security posture until intelligence demonstrates that a lower threshold of 
security is adequate to protect its fans. 
While the threat of hooliganism has waned significantly since the 1980s, the 
problem itself has not fully disappeared from English soccer. The Euros soccer 
competition held in France in 2016 demonstrated that English, as well as Russian, fans 
still have a tendency to commit violent acts against the rival team’s fans. Leading up to a 
match between the England and Russia during the group stage of the completion, a 
number of “clashes between English and Russian hooligans escalated over three days in 
the center of Marseille before vicious fighting spread to the stadium on Saturday 
[gameday].”189 Despite most media outlets placing the majority of blame on Russian 
hooligans for the violence at the Euros, some English fans also engaged in hooligan-
related violence, resurrecting the poor image of English soccer fans abroad. 
D. THE FAN EXPERIENCE 
Average fans can now attend matches in the U.K. without having to continuously 
worry about an outbreak of hooligan-related violence. The measures used to prevent 
hooliganism can be viewed as beneficial in preventing terrorism at EPL games. The 
security teams have done an excellent job monitoring all areas in and around the stadiums 
during games and in responding to issues concerning fan safety. Thanks to the many 
successful safety and security measures in the EPL, the “English club stadiums appear 
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orderly and pacified, football-related arrest figures are low, and England’s international 
image has been substantially reinvented.”190 
Some fans are against the security changes at EPL matches, claiming these 
measures have contributed to a less exciting soccer atmosphere for fear of overzealous 
fan celebrations resulting in expulsion. Fans have voiced their opinions regarding the 
various “civil liberties issues, for example in cases where peaceful football supporters are 
adversely affected by police interventions.”191 The atmosphere is less enjoyable at EPL 
games because they are “becoming over-priced, over-regulated, too quiet, and 
‘sanitised.’”192 Some fans are opposed to the entrance and seating arrangements of the 
stadiums too as they are argued to now “resemble prison camps” as fans are thoroughly 
searched and restricted from travelling around the stadiums.193 
The cultural change within stadiums has been significant because boisterous 
celebrations and rowdy fan behaviors are less prevalent due to a “‘cracking down’ on 
forms of affective interaction that were tolerated and valued in the past.”194 Manchester 
United’s football manager Alex Ferguson echoed this notion when he “commented that 
one home [game] was ‘like a funeral.’”195 Despite some criticisms, fans continue to 
attend matches, with the league’s lowest attendance rate at 80 percent capacity for Aston 
Villa in 2015 and the second-lowest at 91 percent for West Bromwich in that same 
season.196 
E. CONCLUSION 
The EPL was on the verge of collapse until it made the appropriate changes to 
protect its fans from both the hooligans and avoidable accidents that plagued the league 
up to the 1980s. Following this bleak period in the 1980s, the league assessed and 
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corrected its security shortfalls over the ensuing two decades. This effort has attracted 
fans back into the stands as the league promised them both safety and quality football 
games and has delivered. 
The EPL’s safety and security chain of command is well defined and headed by 
the safety officer on match days. The league strongly adheres to the principles of efficient 
communication among staff, rapid threat response, crowd monitoring, and threat analysis 
to protect its fans. Additionally, the league has a strong working relationship with the 
police and other public entities to secure games. Nonetheless, the EPL is ultimately in 
charge of security at games and is liable should an attack occur, which adds further 
incentive for the league to mitigate risks. 
To address and reduce hooligan threats, the league made numerous changes to its 
security doctrine to keep violent offenders from entering the stadiums. First, the EPL 
created numerous FBOs to keep hooligans out of matches, which has been extremely 
successful, as indicated by the waning threat of hooliganism today as compared to the 
1980s. Additionally, other security measures to keep hooligans out, like the use of 
spotters and CCTV, have made it less likely that hooligans can gain close access to the 
stadiums without first being identified. Lastly, the league adheres to the counterterrorism 
measures contained in NaCTSO’s manual to protect its fans from attacks. 
The British view hooliganism to be synonymous with terrorism, and this stance 
has allowed the league to create measures that simultaneously combat risks emanating 
from either violent element. The EPL’s security team is trained and manned to effectively 
respond to violent threats and actions, and this is useful in mitigating hooliganism and 
terrorism alike. While terrorists arguably pose a higher potential to cause death and 
injuries to fans than hooligans, both are still primary concerns to the safety of fans at 
games. 
To address safety concerns like fires or other disasters at matches, the league 
enforces doctrine contained in the Green Guide. The guide outlines all safety related 
concerns from the physical composition of the stadiums, to the different roles and 
responsibilities of security members. The use of the Green Guide helped the EPL in 
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surviving a tough period in the 1980s, and the league has been free of any major incident 
since the Hillsborough stadium disaster nearly 30 years ago. 
Fans now feel safe attending EPL matches, as indicated by the league’s high 
attendance rates, which have led to considerable financial successes for the league and 
individual clubs. The league’s efforts to protect and attract fans to attend matches have 
paid off tremendously. A potential challenge going forward will be for the league to 
retain the same or higher level of security at matches, while also maintaining an 
enjoyable game atmosphere for fans. 
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IV. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
The National Football League has not been attacked by a terrorist organization, 
but the American professional sports league is nonetheless taking measures to protect 
itself and its fans. Therefore, a terrorist organization could be drawn to attack an NFL 
stadium because “it is a microcosm of American culture.”197 The league recognizes this 
potential threat and is taking measures to “act in a professional and prudent manner by 
fulfilling their legal responsibility to provide a safe environment for spectators, officials, 
players, and surrounding community.”198 
In this chapter, I explain the safety and security measures employed by the NFL 
to mitigate terrorism at its non-Super Bowl events to evaluate if these specific actions are 
suitable for thwarting potential attacks against the league and its fans. First, I briefly 
describe the enormous economic value of the NFL, followed, second, by how the 
league’s security plans have changed since 9/11 in response to real and perceived threats 
by implementing both security policies and practices to protect fans. Third, I describe the 
NFL’s security team and how it uses local and federal law enforcement to protect its fans 
at games. Fourth, I compare and compare the league’s security measures between all non-
Super Bowl NFL games to the championship game itself. Then, I discuss the fan 
screening process, security policies to protect fans at games, and the various security 
perimeters around the stadiums. Finally, I discuss some of the criticisms the NFL has 
received regarding its security protocols at games, followed by a conclusion. 
A. NFL: THE MOST ECONOMICALLY VALUABLE SPORTS LEAGUE IN 
THE WORLD 
The NFL is already the most valuable sports league in the world—and the league 
intends to continue cultivating its popularity. The NFL is already valued at roughly three 
times greater than the second-most profitable professional sporting league in the world, 
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the English Premier League. The commissioner of the NFL, Roger Goodell, stated in 
2013 that “he wants to reach $25 billion in annual revenues for the league by the year 
2027,” while the league was only valued at $9 billion in annual revenues in that same 
year.199 This ambitious goal could be difficult to achieve when considering that the NFL 
already has 20 of the top 50 sporting franchises in the world in terms of worth, not so 
closely “followed by MLB (12), NBA (10), and soccer (7).”200 
The NFL depends on continued high attendance rates at regular season games to 
remain well ahead of all other professional sporting leagues in the world in terms of 
revenue and overall viewership. Additionally, to avoid a television broadcast blackout 
due to attendances rates falling below local and cable network thresholds, the league is 
incentivized to fill the seats at its stadiums. For their part, the fans attend NFL games 
because they expect an exciting atmosphere that is unachievable from watching the game 
on television. 
To get more fans to attend games regularly, the NFL commissioned an outside 
source poll of its fans in June of 2014 called the “‘Voice of the Fan,’ detailing the 
findings of its most extensive analysis ever of the in-game experience, including results 
from an independent consultant and polling of tens of thousands of fans.”201 The survey 
was then used to compare and rank each team in the following subsections: “Arrivals, 
safety and security, game-day staff, in-game enhancements and technology, game 
entertainment, concessions, and leaving the stadium.”202 Individual franchises have 
adopted the findings of the survey and have acted to improve any areas that the report 
turned up as needing attention.203 
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For example, the Washington Redskins, as extrapolated from the survey’s 
findings, had problems getting their fans into the stadium in a timely manner, which 
ultimately lowered the satisfaction for those people attending games. The team remedied 
these issues immediately at FedEx Field, which has resulted in “less waiting at stadium 
gates, with lines clearing about 10 minutes more quickly; and better game-day features, 
with entertainment satisfaction scores up 15 percent.”204 The NFL appears committed to 
its growth, which means that protecting its fans at games will become ever more critical 
in the upcoming years. 
B. NFL SECURITY REFORMS SINCE 9/11 
Even before 9/11, the NFL had security teams and measures to protect its fans, 
but after the attacks the league approached its security scheme differently. Milton 
Ahlerich sums up the NFL’s commitment to security since 9/11: “In my post as the Vice 
President of Security for the National Football League … , we have a variety of security 
programs that deal with protecting our most important assets, and our most important 
assets are not only the game and the fans—certainly the events themselves are very, very 
high on the list—but also our most important human resources, our players.”205 The 
security policies and practices enforced at NFL games come from the SAFETY Act and 
are used in the league’s security manual. 
1. SAFETY Act 
During the year following the attacks of 9/11, companies became hesitant to 
change or alter their security schemes for fear of garnering additional liabilities in 
protecting their businesses.206 Therefore, the government created a measure to protect 
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companies when it created the “Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies (SAFETY) Act in 2002.”207 The SAFETY Act incentivized companies to 
create security measures to protect their businesses since according to Kimberly 
Schimmel, “insurance costs for all terrorism-related ‘potentially foreseeable’ risks 
became incredibly expensive.”208 Additionally, “the federal government grew concerned 
that the massive ‘liability could stifle the entrepreneurial spirit for developing 
technologies and products that disrupt attacks and enable an effective response.’”209 
To qualify under the SAFETY Act, companies were tasked to create measures 
that were “designed, developed, modified, provided or procured for the specific purpose 
of preventing, detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism.”210 Additionally, to 
qualify as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT) under the SAFETY Act, the 
security technologies must “perform as intended,” “conform to the seller’s 
specifications,” and “be safe for use as intended.”211 
Finally, a company applying for protection under the SAFETY Act must sustain 
sufficient “liability insurance that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security… 
determines the Seller must maintain.”212 The NFL is covered under the SAFETY Act, 
and it “is the only professional sports league that has a comprehensive set of best 
practices for stadium security certified by the Department of Homeland Security.”213 
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2. Safety Manuals 
The league standardized and improved its security scheme by creating the NFL’s 
Best Practices for Stadium Security manual, or otherwise known as the Best Practices 
Guide. The first draft of this manual was produced within two to three months after the 
9/11 attacks when a “task force met and evolved into publishing a set of best practices for 
NFL stadiums and best practices for security.”214 
The Department of Homeland Security’s division of Command, Control and 
Interoperability Center for Advanced Data Analysis (CCICADA) created the Best 
Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security for Sporting and Entertainment Venues Resource 
Guide, or BPATS, to give guidance to companies wishing to seek liability protections in 
case of a terrorist attack post-9/11. This guide’s purpose “is aimed in assisting owners 
and operators of sports venues who are developing, deploying and improving the anti-
terrorism readiness of their venues and who are interested in submitting an application for 
coverage of their venue security under the … [SAFETY] Act.”215 
The CCICADA-produced guide addresses all aspects necessary, and in some 
cases recommended, for companies to tailor their Anti-Terrorism (AT) plans to qualify as 
a QATT under the SAFETY Act. The NFL’s Best Practices Guide is protected under the 
SAFETY Act as a QATT, and in its application the league used BPATS to address all 
requirements of the SAFETY Act. The Best Practices Guide is used by all 32 NFL 
franchises to provide a common threshold of protection at all stadiums. 
The Best Practices Guide qualified as a QATT in 2009 and is valid through the 
2016 season, and the manual contains “the League’s guidelines for stadium and event 
security and operations.”216 The Best Practices Guide contains security “standards for 
non-game day operations, game day operations, and threat assessments and emergency 
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plans.”217 This guide conforms to the SAFETY Act’s “standards for game day and non-
game day operations, threat assessments and emergency plans, and the hiring, vetting, 
and training of personnel used to provide the services.”218 
The Best Practices Guide has been praised by DHS in receiving awards for its 
“practices of digital surveillance, spectator searches, the enforcement of barricaded 
zones, threat assessments, and the hiring, vetting, and training of personnel.”219 To 
mitigate the risk of terrorists planning their attack around the perceived weaknesses of its 
security scheme, the NFL keeps the guide private, but “has shared [it] with other leagues, 
including Major League Baseball and the National Basketball Association.”220 
Additionally, the NFL is protected legally from having to disclose its guide to the 
public since “QATT specifics are exempt from the [U.S.] Freedom of Information 
Act.”221 The amount of liability protections provided to the NFL is uncertain, though, 
because “it is not clear how the NFL’s immunity under the SAFETY Act will influence 
this reasonableness analysis in civil liberties litigation.”222 Beyond the potential risk of 
civil disputes following a terrorist attack, the NFL could suffer dwindling attendance at 
games that would compromise the financial wellbeing of the league. The NFL 
continually analyses its security posture to prevent attacks from happening. 
The Best Practices Guide is discussed annually during NFL “Committee on 
Stadium Security” meetings to look at policies and ways to improve them.223 The NFL 
has tried to balance the amount and extent of the security it provides at games, hoping not 
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to push away common fans. Therefore, policies should not only protect fans, but also not 
“degrade the value of the experience” in attending games.224 The league has worked to 
find the balance in maintaining a high level of security for its fans, while at the same time 
making the gameday environment enjoyable. 
C. NFL SECURITY CHAIN OF COMMAND 
While there is a lack of open source documentation on the specific jobs and roles 
of various NFL security workers, the league bears the overall responsibility for the safety 
of its fans at games, and it shares security responsibilities with various public entities. 
The NFL appoints individual directors of security for its franchises that “can establish a 
set of minimum competency standards for venue security employees and contractors at 
all levels.”225 The director of security uses the security plans of the Best Practice Guide 
to “follow the National Incident Management System’s (NIMS) Incident Command 
System (ICS) as the model for organizing an incident response.”226 
Prior to each game, the director of security will chair a meeting with both NFL 
security members and public entities to appoint specific responsibilities to each element 
of the security force in the event of a terrorist attack or disaster. The security team will 
discuss specific responsibilities during its risk assessment meeting to “include standard 
staffing plans and training for event and non-event days detailing the number of staff 
available, and their assigned positions.”227 
During games, the Director of Security will work in the Command Center with 
other “members of supporting and stakeholder agencies to efficiently communicate with 
security team members.”228 Unlike the EPL, the specific makeup of the security 
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enterprise at NFL games is not published. However, the league uses a combination of 
private security and public entities to maintain safe conditions at games. Additionally, 
each security member will have a replacement member appointed prior to games.229 
1. Private/Public Partnership 
The NFL shares the responsibility of protecting its fans with law enforcement at 
games. The partnership is made possible through meetings before games and other events 
where “mutual aid agreements between the venue operator or security director and local 
law enforcement can include tabletop exercises that provide benefits for both parties.”230 
The specific roles for individuals and departments are discussed prior to events under a 
“Unified Command Doctrine,” so that different entities can “make response decisions 
together according to ICS guidelines.”231 The NFL can also request additional support 
from law enforcement agencies as needed to garner a “higher levels of government and 
law enforcement” at games.232 
An NFL statement released in 2015 explains in general terms how it works with 
the public sector in securing games: “the NFL and team security departments work 
closely with stadium operation personnel and federal, state, and local law enforcement to 
provide a safe experience for the more than 17 million fans who annually attend NFL 
games.”233 The shared responsibility between the NFL, local agencies, and sometimes 
even federal agencies, protects fans and has been “beneficial in ways that help secure the 
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NFL’s position and profitability and, more importantly, help implement and secure 
consensus for the [U.S.] Department of Homeland Security’s ‘war on terror.’”234 
2. Police Presence at Games 
The police presence at NFL games is considerable both, to deter attacks and to 
respond quickly to threats inside and within close vicinity of the stadiums. A statement 
from the New York Giants demonstrates the need for a large police presence at games 
following 9/11: 
What we have done is major deterrence. As you come through the toll 
plazas, you see state police cars out there. We now do our checks outside 
the gates rather than inside the gates, and inside that corral area are state 
police. When you come through the turnstiles, the first thing you see are 
state police cars. When you go to your seat, you see state police walking 
around the concourse, which is something we have not done before.235 
The league has maintained a high police presence at its games since 9/11, and not 
just in major cities like New York or Chicago. For example, the smallest city in terms of 
population that has an NFL team, Green Bay, has embraced the notion of needing a 
significant police presence at their games to protect the stadium capable of seating just 
over 80,000 fans. At Green Bay Packers games “Police officers are stationed at each 
entrance gate to ensure your safety while visiting Lambeau Field.”236 The police presence 
is also sizable and highly visible within the stadiums, as is the case in Seattle where 
“Police Department and King County officers are stationed throughout CenturyLink Field 
and CenturyLink Field Event Center” to respond to emergencies and threats.237 This 
effort is viewed as beneficial in deterring terrorism because the high visibility of police 
officers at games gives the impression that the NFL is committed to target hardening to 
prevent terrorism.  
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3. Intelligence for Gameday Threat Mitigation 
In planning for gameday operations the NFL gathers and discusses all related 
intelligence and threats, which ultimately determines the security scheme and staffing for 
an event. The BPATS guide calls for sporting leagues to create “a Dynamic On-going 
Risk Assessment (DORA) process to enhance risk management capabilities.”238 The use 
of this analytical tool “enables a venue to take just-in-time information such as updated 
intelligence, changes in resource availability, or other potential changes to the baseline 
risk assessment assumptions, and incorporate them into an event-specific security plan to 
reduce the risk to a venue.”239 Thus, NFL gameday security will be tailored appropriately 
based on time-sensitive intelligence that is disseminated during the risk assessment 
meetings. 
The pregame intelligence analysis also considers how “threats, vulnerability, and 
consequences can change based on new intelligence (changes in terrorists’ weapons, new 
attack scenarios and new target groups) and changes in any situation around or within the 
venue.”240 To create a cohesive security plan regarding specific threats at each event, the 
intelligence is briefed and shared with all major players to include the team’s 
management, all involved local and federal law enforcement agencies, city government 
officials, transportation staff, NFL security and stadium staff members, and even 
“parking operators (third-party and venue).”241 
Intelligence provided to the NFL can come from both local law enforcement and 
federal agencies, and the information will include both specific and perceived threats to 
gameday operations. To staff events appropriately, based on intelligence, the NFL first 
assesses any information received from “state law enforcement, and any specific security 
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threats the venue has received.”242 The NFL also works in “coordination and 
communication with public safety and public health officials, as well as the local JTTF 
(Joint Terrorism Task Force) and fusion centers where possible,” to receive up-to-date 
intelligence related to an event.243 
Finally, the NFL can request intelligence for specific events “from the state police 
or state bureau of identification and the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and 
Field Intelligence Group (FIG).”244 The NFL’s working relationship with various 
intelligence sources helps the league to protect its fans at games, while minimizing seams 
for terrorists to exploit. 
D. SECURITY MEASURES AT REGULAR SEASON GAMES 
The NFL has undergone massive changes to its security procedures and 
technologies at regular season games post-9/11 in response to the perceived threats in its 
annual security risk assessments. Today the NFL uses a number of security measures—
both in and around its stadiums—to protect its players, fans, and structures from terrorist 
attacks. The league approaches each game as an individual event that must have 
sufficient security to protect its fans. This security planning approach has successfully 
prevented any terrorist attack from happening at an NFL game despite the large number 
of attacks occurring annually in the United States and around the world.  
This section discusses the various technologies the NFL uses for security at 
games, the policies to protect fans, the various tailored measures that teams employ for 
security, and the perimeter security around the games. 
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1. Conventional Metal Detectors 
Harvard Law professor, Richard Fallon Jr., questioned the limited use of metal 
detectors at NFL games in 2003 arguing: “If you are not using metal detectors for all 
events when you use them for some events, are you living up to a standard of reasonable 
care?”245 This question has since been addressed as all NFL franchises are now required 
to use metal detectors at all games. Since the NFL’s Best Practices Guide was certified as 
a QATT under the SAFETY Act in 2008, the league has outfitted all of its stadiums to 
use conventional walk-through metal detectors, otherwise known as magnetometers, to 
screen all fans entering games. The league stipulates that “all NFL clubs use mandatory 
metal detector screening and multiple layers of perimeter security external to the stadium 
to safeguard fans and the stadium from explosive threats.”246 
This policy of using magnetometers and visual screening for fans entering 
stadiums replaced the previous method of using handheld metal wanding devices and pat-
downs. The argument to switch to conventional walk-through metal detectors for fan 
screening is that “magnetometers are considered to be more effective than the other two 
methods.”247 The ability to detect weapons using magnetometers is not only more 
accurate, but “patrons often find magnetometers less invasive than wandings and 
patdowns and most patrons are familiar with them since they are used in airports.”248 
Additionally, magnetometers are significantly faster than the previous methods since the 
“average magnetometer screening times per patron would range from 5 to 7 seconds,” 
which is 1–2 seconds faster per person than pat-downs and twice as fast as wanding.249 
The benefit of the magnetometer’s rapid screening time and accuracy is that it 
helps to reduce the congestion of the waiting lines outside the stadium. This point is 
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important because the congested lines and areas outside the stadium are more vulnerable 
to terrorists wishing to produce mass casualties. After the Boston Marathon attacks, 
“security personnel recognized that crowds of uninspected patrons could easily be the 
target of a similar bombing attack,” which is a vulnerability in the security lines outside 
NFL stadiums.250 The very presence of magnetometers at stadiums is considered 
acceptable to NFL fans since this type of security measure is becoming standard in the 
post-9/11 world. Additionally, the presence of magnetometers could be useful in 
mitigating terrorists from attempting to smuggle weapons inside NFL stadiums. 
The security at NFL games has increased since the league introduced 
magnetometers at all stadiums and games, which has helped “to increase the security of 
soft targets such as sports stadiums and arenas.”251 Unlike airports, though, where people 
can opt for either the whole-body scanner or pat-down method in the screening lines, 
guests at NFL stadiums must use the magnetometers because “refusal to comply may be 
grounds to prohibit admission.”252 
2. Clear Bag Policy 
The NFL created its Clear Bag Policy, or Bag Policy, for all teams to use 
following the Boston Marathon attacks in 2013. The Bag Policy limits what type of bags 
fans could bring into stadiums to just “one-gallon clear plastic freezer bag,” a similarly 
sized NFL brand clear plastic bag, or a small woman’s clutch purse so that security 
guards could quickly assess and scan its contents.253 This policy replaces the former 
policy where fans could carry backpacks into stadiums after being checked by security 
personnel. 
The Bag Policy has reduced the wait times for fans in entering the stadiums and 
has made the screening checks “much easier, allowing staff to be more efficient and 
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effective in checking bags.”254 The NFL does have exceptions to its Bag Policy to allow 
for larger items to be hand-carried into stadiums such as blankets, binoculars (out of their 
case), seat cushions, and medical-related items once the given items are searched.255 Fans 
refusing to adhere to the Bag Policy are not allowed into the stadiums, but fans are 
allowed to carry backpacks in the tailgate areas and outside the secondary perimeter.256 
3. Surveillance Cameras 
Similar to the EPL, the NFL has adopted the use of surveillance cameras to 
monitor the inside and outside of its stadiums during games; indeed, the use of “video 
surveillance cameras are very much a part of Best Practices.”257 Under the Best Practices 
Guide, “the [NFL] has urged owners to ‘install internal and external cameras (digital) 
with pan, tilt, zoom and monitoring capability covering all vulnerable areas.’”258 The 
employment of both “cameras and sweeps by security staff are two measures that can be 
deployed effectively throughout the middle and inner security zones,” which helps to 
further the safety of fans at games.259 
4. If You See Something, Say Something 
In addition to the use of security guards and screening procedures to protect fans 
at games, the NFL uses the DHS If you see something, say something campaign to inform 
fans to report any suspicious activity to the proper authorities. In 2012 the former 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, announced that the NFL adheres 
appropriately to the campaign “to help ensure the safety and security of employees, 
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players and fans during the regular season, and Super Bowl XLVI.”260 Fans are therefore 
used to supplement stadium security at games since they may be in position to notice 
suspicious activity before security personnel do so. 
This campaign has received some criticism in that fans are being compared to 
“citizen soldiers… being recruited by the DHS to participate in a public awareness 
campaign to report ‘suspicious activity’ to state and local law enforcement agencies.”261 
Opposed to this notion is the fact that fans could be the first to notice certain unsafe 
conditions, and by reporting this information to stadium security it enhances the crowd’s 
safety and their own. 
5. Individual Teams Tailor Security Measures to their Needs 
Liability protection in the Best Practice Guide under the SAFETY Act “does not 
include each NFL club’s or stadium owner’s or operator’s implementation of the 
Technology.”262 Teams are not individually covered under the SAFETY Act because 
each stadium has different physical characteristics that require different security schemes, 
and some stadiums are more likely to “host extremely high profile events (raising the 
value of an attack in the minds of terrorists).”263 Therefore, each team must not only use 
the Best Practices Guide to implement the league mandated security measures in its 
stadium, but must also tailor its security based on its needs. Additionally, each team’s 
“management should be prepared to implement additional screening measures should 
Department of Homeland Security elevate the alert level.”264 
Individual franchises can apply for liability protection under the SAFETY Act, 
and the Green Bay Packers were accepted as a QATT that “covers the entire stadium 
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property, including the seating bowl and suites, gates, loading dock, inner and secondary 
perimeters, field, locker rooms, area housing utility and mechanical systems, command 
center, and parking areas.”265 Similarly, the Arizona Cardinals’ University of Phoenix 
Stadium and the shared New York Jets and New York Giants MetLife Stadium have had 
their security plans accepted as QATTs under the SAFETY Act.266 This trend of 
individual teams submitting their security plans to be covered under the SAFETY Act is 
likely to continue in the upcoming years. 
6. Security Perimeters 
The league’s teams employ different security procedures inside the stadiums than 
in the surrounding areas around the stadiums. The BPATS guide states that “venue 
security operations are often implemented using a layered approach of outer, middle, and 
inner zones,” and the NFL utilizes the same three perimeters in securing its stadiums and 
fans.267 The BPATS guide is helpful in explaining what the NFL’s security plans must 
adhere to in regards to perimeter security, since the NFL used this guide to conform to 
SAFETY Act requirements. 
a. Outer Perimeter 
The outer perimeter, as indicated by its name, is the furthest out level of 
protection, and it is used to examine both fan and vehicle traffic flow around the 
stadiums. This perimeter contains the road and transportation systems within relatively 
close proximity to the stadiums, and NFL security forces work with local law 
enforcement agencies to mitigate risks originating from these areas through surveillance 
and closing roads or “re-routing traffic as necessary.”268 
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Contained in the outer perimeter are portions of the “parking lots and structures” 
where tailgating activities take place; however, many of the parking and tailgate areas are 
not owned by the stadium and not enforced under league policies.269 Tailgating will 
therefore have its own section following a description of the three security perimeters. 
The outer perimeter itself is protected using “cameras and foot patrols, as well as 
structural and landscape design features.”270 Additional security can be deployed in the 
outer perimeter using canine units to “maintain an established security perimeter so that 
potential bomb threats cannot get close to the venue.”271 
All vehicles travelling through the outer perimeter toward the middle and inner 
zones are searched and must be on the team’s manifest, which contains “a list of vehicles, 
their plate numbers, and their personnel.”272 This area is used to “establish 100-foot 
secure outer perimeter around the stadium to the maximum extent possible,” and 
roadblocks are placed appropriately to prevent unauthorized vehicles from gaining close 
access to the stadium itself.273 
b. Middle Perimeter 
The middle, or secondary perimeter, is the area directly inside the outer perimeter 
up to, and including, the security checkpoints that lead fans into the stadiums. The middle 
perimeter is lined with NFL security staffers around its outer edge who visually scan the 
fans walking toward the security checkpoints to prevent “prohibited items or bags being 
carried toward the stadium so those situations can be corrected immediately.”274 This 
scan is useful in mitigating the risk of a fan sneaking a backpack into the security lines, 
which of course is not allowed under the league’s Bag Policy. Additionally, the 
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secondary area is manned by stadium personnel and police tasked to conduct “regularly 
performed sweeps” to address any unsafe conditions or suspicious activity.275 
To reduce line congestion for fans entering the stadiums just prior to kick-off, all 
NFL teams open their gates two to three hours before games. For example, the Baltimore 
Ravens released the following message to fans on its official website: “due to heightened 
security measures at the gates, we strongly urge all guests to arrive at the stadium as early 
as possible to avoid entrance delays particularly in colder weather.”276 According to 
BPATS, this type of measure in opening stadium gates well before kickoff is a useful risk 
mitigation tactic since reducing “queuing lines is important, because those standing in the 
lines can be a target for terrorist acts.”277 
c. Inner Perimeter 
The inner perimeter is the secured area within the stadium where all fans and 
vehicles have passed through a screening process to gain access. Vehicles are not allowed 
access into this area on gamedays unless they are on the manifest and are delivering 
“perishable items.”278 On all other days, vehicles can access the stadiums once searched 
and if the delivery is expected and cleared.279 This measure enables NFL teams to have 
sufficient knowledge of whom and what is entering their stadiums. 
Canines are also used periodically “to conduct explosives sweeps of stadiums” 
prior to games depending on the availability of these units under local police forces and 
in response to specific intelligence threats.280 Prior to each game, each element of the 
security team is trained on their specific responses to attacks within this perimeter. 
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Stadium managers also create preemptive instructions for fans to inform them 
about how to respond to specific incidents, which will be displayed on “the electronic 
message boards” as needed.281 For example, the Seattle Seahawks state that “in the event 
of a serious CenturyLink Field and Event Center emergency, all event staff, law 
enforcement and fire personnel are available to assist guests, including those with 
disabilities” and the information is displayed on the team’s message boards.282 
E. LEVELS OF SECURITY: THE SUPER BOWL VERSUS OTHER NFL 
GAMES 
The NFL Super Bowl receives the highest level of security for any single annual 
sporting event in the United States, and some of the measures created at these 
championship games are then eventually filtered to non-Super Bowl games. The NFL 
championship game receives the highest level of security since it is considered a 
“National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and Special Event Activity Rating… Level I” 
event due to its holiday like national atmosphere and global appeal.283 Therefore, the 
Super Bowl is viewed as “an obvious terrorist target, as such attacks will attract the 
attention of the world to the particular terrorist cause.”284 
As an NSSE event, the Super Bowl receives support from “the two federal law 
enforcement agencies that are most involved in securing major special events—the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Secret Service.”285 The job of the Secret 
Service at the Super Bowl is to help in “security planning, venue and motorcade security, 
communications, credentialing, and training,” whereas the FBI is used for the 
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“management of intelligence, crisis management, hostage rescue, and counterterrorism 
matters.”286 
The additional security measures at the Super Bowl differentiates it from other 
NFL games because the host city will literally have years to plan for the event, including 
a two-week period between the Super Bowl and the two Conference Championship 
matches when the league receives a significant amount of federal funding and support. 
Due massive amount of federal and local agencies involved, the Super Bowl is viewed by 
some, such as Schimmel, to be “a uniquely militarized sport mega-event.”287 
The additional security measures at the Super Bowl are readily apparent when 
compared to non-Super Bowl NFL games. For example, the Super Bowl “requires the 
close coordination of hundreds of agencies within a context of the modern homeland 
security–oriented event-planning paradigm.”288 The types of terrorist attacks that can be 
executed at the Super Bowl are wide-ranging, which means the league must have close 
coordination with local and federal agencies to consider and plan for the following 
contingencies: “chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) 
liabilities, assurance of intelligence sharing, critical infrastructure protection, mass 
casualty planning, and NIMS compliant command and control.”289 
The Super Bowl often introduces new security measures, which are sometimes 
adopted by the league for its non-Super Bowl games. For example, “the first pat-down 
search policy was implemented for Super Bowl XXVII in February 2002,” which became 
a league standard at all games in the following season until being replaced by the use of 
conventional walk-through metal detectors.290 As an NSSE event, the Super Bowl 
security plan enjoys the use of security forces that are in short supply. An example of this 
is when the “ATF [Alcohol Tobacco Firearms] is also able to deploy large numbers of 
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canines, when requested, to National Special Security Events” to search for firearms and 
explosive devices.291 
It is not feasible for other NFL games to achieve the same level of protection for 
its fans. The problem is that the level of planning, coordination, time, and funding for 
security at the Super Bowl greatly exceeds that of a regular season matchup. On a typical 
Sunday during the regular season, from 13 to 15 games will occur over a 10-hour 
timespan in cities spread across America, which is different from a centralized event like 
the Super Bowl where all focus and funding can be directed at securing the game. 
Regardless of the differences between NSSE and non-NSSE NFL games, the Super Bowl 
has provided insights into the effectiveness of new security technologies and measures, 
which have in some cases been applied to the security plans at non-Super Bowl NFL 
games. 
The security measures at non-Super Bowl NFL games receive far less funding, 
planning, and federal support than the championship match, which means these games 
are inherently less secure. The main reason for this shortage of security when comparing 
the two is that regular games fall into the category of being “Non-NSSE mass 
gatherings.”292 
There are several factors that limit the security at regular games as opposed to the 
Super Bowl, such as those elements concerning “logistical, operational, financial, and 
administrative challenges.”293 Instead of receiving a SEAR 1 event status like the Super 
Bowl, all other NFL games are considered SEAR 4 events. As such, all non-Super Bowl 
NFL games are deemed to have “limited national importance” that typically only garner 
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local law enforcement support.294 Therefore, terrorists unable to find a seam to attack the 
Super Bowl could “pivot to softer SEAR 4–5 event targets.”295 
F. CRITICISMS OF THE NFL’S SECURITY PLANS 
How much security should teams use to protect fans while balancing the amount 
of scrutiny placed on typical fans entering the stadiums? There is a need for the NFL to 
achieve this balance of security to protect fans without pushing them away. For example, 
the Seattle Seahawks have tried to achieve this balance as they state they are “committed 
to improving your game day experience and providing a safe, family-friendly 
environment.”296 Other teams also advertise this same type of commitment on their 
official websites. 
That being said, it would be difficult for the NFL to achieve a “family-friendly 
environment” if fans saw military helicopters, parked tanks, soldiers with automatic 
weapons, and patrolling Humvees at all games, similar to the scene at the Super Bowl in 
recent years. Despite the lower level of security at non-Super Bowl NFL games, the 
league is considered to have the best security at its games when compared to other major 
American sporting leagues, and “other stadiums have watched the NFL closely and 
followed, to the extent possible, security enhancements pioneered by the NFL.”297 
1. Airspace Concerns  
Some stadiums are in the direct flight path of major airports, which some argue to 
be a significant safety concern. The issue is that NFL stadiums are packed with 60,000+ 
fans during games, and the 9/11 attacks demonstrated the devastation a jet crash, whether 
intentional or even accidental, can have on a structure. Despite this safety concern, 
several stadiums built in the past decade are situated along the flight paths of major 
international airports, to include “Levi's Stadium in Santa Clara and MetLife Stadium in 
                                                 
294 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” 5. 
295 Gehring, “Sports Venue Security,” 53. 
296 Seattle Seahawks, “Seahawks Gameday- Gameday Policies and Information.” 
297 National Football League, “NFL Teams to Enhance Public Safety and Improve Stadium Access.” 
 71
East Rutherford, N.J.”298 While nothing can be done for stadiums already built along an 
airport’s flight path, the NFL has not created a policy to prohibit franchises from building 
new stadiums in these vulnerable areas. 
The Los Angeles Rams are currently shopping locations to build their future 
stadium, and one of the locations is in close proximity to Los Angeles International 
Airport. This Inglewood site would be directly in the LAX flight path. Former Homeland 
Secretary Tom Ridge has voiced his concerns regarding the Rams’ proposed stadium site. 
Ridge’s spokesperson stated that “in a post-9/11 world, Gov. Ridge believes we shouldn't 
be building stadiums in the direct flight path of one of the busiest airports in the 
world.”299 The former Homeland Secretary finds it “both disturbing and curious that 
there is such great interest in hyping the political discussion surrounding Inglewood to 
the distraction of safety and security concerns.”300 Ridge also sent a letter to the NFL 
stating that “it is my sincere hope that your committee will exercise judgment and a 
standard of care on behalf of the NFL that goes beyond parochial financial interests and 
focuses instead on safety, security and other holistic factors involved in stadium site 
selection.”301 
The counter is that NFL teams are limited in terms of available lots within close 
proximity to city centers and the majority of their game-going fans. Additionally, the 
former head of security for the New York Giants, William Squires, believes that 
commercial airplanes will continue to fly over stadiums, arguing the importance of air 
travel over sport since “the NFL is big but the aviation industry is just a little bit 
bigger.”302 
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2. How Much Is Too Much? 
There is an argument that the NFL provides too much security at games, which 
ultimately detracts from the enjoyment of attending these events. Kimberly Schimmel of 
Kent State University argues that the militarized atmosphere at NFL stadiums has caused 
the following issue: “new relationships are currently emerging—and established ones 
intensifying—between sport cultures and transforming urban environments.”303 
Schimmel argues that she is not alone in this criticism, by citing that “a number of 
sociologists of sport are focusing attention on the ways in which new urban spaces of the 
post-9/11 era are increasingly viewed as terrain on which military tactics and weaponry 
are necessary to protect capital investments, control crowds and prevent and respond to 
terrorist attacks.”304 The argument is that the NFL’s overbearing security scheme is only 
increasing, and these measures will ultimately affect the common fan. 
Similarly, some skeptics wonder: Is the NFL trying to protect its fans or itself? 
The NFL has gone to great lengths to create unified security plans, and its Best Practices 
Guide has been accepted by DHS to provide liability protections to the league under the 
SAFETY Act. Schimmel argues that the league’s security enhancements were selfishly 
created, to the effect of “it is not fans that are protected, it is the NFL.”305 While fans 
benefit from the protections under the Best Practices Guide, the notion that the league 
may be concerned with its financial livelihood over the protection of its fans at games is 
disturbing. 
On the other hand, all non-Super Bowl NFL games are considered SEAR 4 
events, meaning they do not require federal services due to a lack of national importance, 
despite have weekly attendances of “more than 1.1 million Americans… at 16 different 
venues nationwide.”306 
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Additionally, the NFL has been criticized for not allowing off-duty police officers 
to carry their service weapons into stadiums. Various police units have argued that off-
duty police would enhance the safety at games if armed, but the league ruled has that 
“NFL stadiums on gamedays would be best-served by the carrying of firearms [only] by 
on-duty officers specifically assigned to work the game as part of the comprehensive 
public safety plan for the event.”307 The NFL prohibits off-duty police from carrying 
weapons into games because “they may not have the same training and do not participate 
in the weekly preparation meetings.”308 
3. Excessive Fan Screening Procedures 
While this issue is not as salient as it was a decade ago, some fans are still 
opposed to the screening procedures when entering NFL stadiums. When the NFL started 
its pat-down policy to screen fans, some fans felt this policy to be in violation of their 
Fourth Amendment rights. During the 2005 season, a Tampa Bay Buccaneers season 
ticket holder sued his team, and a “Florida court ruled that the pat-downs at Buccaneers 
home games violated federal and Florida state protections against unreasonable 
searches.”309 During the same season, another lawsuit ensued against a franchise when 
“the ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] of Northern California sued the San 
Francisco 49ers on behalf of season ticket holders, Dan and Kathleen Sheehan, alleging 
that the team’s ‘pat-down’ policy violated the couple’s right to privacy under the state 
constitution.”310 
While the league has switched to visual scanning and magnetometers to screen 
fans, a minority of fans are nonetheless opposed the NFL’s current fan screening 
measures. Nevertheless, most fans are fine with the NFL’s screening procedures, as a 
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Harris poll indicates that “more than 85 percent of the respondents did not believe that 
their personal privacy was violated by searches prior to entering the sport stadium.”311 
G. CONCLUSION 
The NFL augments its security posture in response to perceived threats, as it did 
subsequent to the 2015 Paris attacks, especially the attacks at the Stade de France during 
a friendly, national-level soccer match. The weekend following the Paris attacks showed 
an increase of NFL “security and law enforcement presence inside and outside all its 
stadiums.”312 Additionally, the league worked with public entities to assess specific 
intelligence threats at its games. In a statement from the NFL directly following the Paris 
attacks, an NFL spokesman stated the following: “we are closely monitoring events and 
have been in communication with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, 
which have informed us that there are no known threats against NFL stadiums.”313 
Despite not having any known threats to stadiums, the NFL maintained higher 
levels of security throughout the 2015 season. The league likely will discuss further 
mitigating measures to ensure that a Paris-type attack will not happen at a NFL game 
during the next annual safety meetings. Further security measures could stem from the 
Paris attacks, such as when the league implemented the Bag Policy following the Boston 
Marathon attacks. 
Since 9/11, the league has demonstrated a strong will to deter would-be terrorists 
from attacking its games. The continued growth of the NFL’s security enterprise and shift 
of security measures in flexing to both domestic and international threats attacks shows 
the league’s commitment to protecting its games. This state of affairs is diametrically 
different from the NFL’s commitment prior to 9/11 when security was an afterthought as 
compared to the game itself. 
The NFL’s security plan has been influential in terms of sporting security 
measures, and the other American professional sports leagues can learn from the football 
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league’s forethought and ingenuity in this field. The NFL appears to be doing as well as 
can reasonably be expected in protecting its games from attacks. 
The breadth and depth of the NFL’s security plans is not complete, however, in 
part because large stretches of the stadium area—access, parking, and tailgate areas—are 
not owned by the league and are not always subject to the league’s sole control. What, if 
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V. TAILGATING AT NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE GAMES 
As robust as the NFL security measures are for stadiums during the regular 
season, the area just outside the stadium seems startlingly under-secured. This omission is 
important because this area has its own very prominent place in the live-attendance 
rituals of NFL games: the tailgate festivities. In these tailgate parking areas, fans often 
congregate, socialize, drink, eat, barbecue, and watch satellite television before and after 
the game they are attending. As recent attacks elsewhere—notably the Nice, France, 
truck assault on Bastille Day revelers—demonstrate, such gatherings of masses of people 
can be targets themselves, and the potential for numerous casualties is high. This chapter 
examines the security situation of the tailgate area. 
There is little information regarding tailgating security measures contained within 
the Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security for Sporting and Entertainment Venues 
Resource Guide, or BPATS.314 Therefore, I examined eight of the league’s 32 teams to 
assess the different security procedures in these areas. The teams I analyzed represent 
various geographic regions to include the South, Midwest, Northeast, and Northwest. 
I discovered several notable differences among the teams I analyzed in regards to 
their tailgating rules and restrictions, which suggests that this lack of standardization in 
tailgate regulations could leave some teams more vulnerable to an attack than others. A 
major issue in security that affects all the teams I looked at is that third-party–owned lots 
are not equipped with the same level of security protection as NFL-owned lots. The NFL-
owned lots use “Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras… to support monitoring and 
response” in addition to roving security personnel to secure their tailgates.315 Privately 
owned areas are not subject to the rules of NFL franchises and, therefore, may not 
include comparable security measures. 
In this chapter, I first describe how NFL tailgate areas could be prone to attacks 
based on a fundamental lack of security as compared to the stadiums themselves. Second, 
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I outline the few similarities in tailgate policies among the teams I analyzed. Third, I 
describe the various security measures used in tailgate lots to mitigate risks, followed by 
a conclusion of my findings. 
A. TAILGATES COULD BE MORE PRONE TO ATTACKS 
Tailgate areas could potentially be at risk for a number of reasons. First, these 
parking lots are typically large and spread out without having sufficient police and 
security forces to patrol the lots. Second, vehicles entering the tailgates are generally 
unsearched and fans are allowed to carry backpacks in these areas. Additionally, many of 
the lots are privately owned and not subject to league policies. During the hours leading 
up to a NFL game, there are numerous dispersed tailgates taking place within walking 
distance from the stadiums, and many of these can have hundreds to thousands of fans 
concentrated in small areas. The problem is that these small areas packed with fans could 
become attractive targets to a terrorist wishing to inflict mass causalities. 
Indeed, according to security specialist James Gehring, the individual franchise’s 
“stadium bowls are not the only potential terrorist target but parking lots and tailgating 
events are also potential terrorist targets.”316 This argument seems fair when considering 
that the NFL’s security scheme is focused on the stadium, which then reduces the 
security forces available in protecting the tailgates to the same extent. 
The vast tailgate areas cannot reasonably be protected to the same level as the 
stadiums because they are dispersed over a much greater area. For example, the Dallas 
Cowboys team owns “approximately 12,000 parking spaces distributed among 15 
numbered lots at AT&T Stadium,” which does not even account for privately owned lots 
where other tailgates take place.317 To provide adequate protection in the tailgate areas, 
teams would have to employ significantly more security personnel and convey the need 
for additional police forces to patrol lots both before and after games. 
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Authorities, be they the local police or NFL security staff, are often patrolling the 
tailgate lots to reduce alcohol consumption and to prevent disorderly behavior from fans. 
While such measures are important to create a safe and enjoyable atmosphere for all fans 
at the tailgate, all security personnel should be watchful for suspicious activity and to 
should think about how to respond in case of such activity. 
B. SIMILARITIES IN TAILGATE POLICIES AMONG THE ANALYZED 
FRANCHISES 
First, the teams have certain restrictions on fans in the tailgate area, but they are 
few, far between, and perhaps even unenforceable. For example, all teams state clearly 
that no weapons of any kind are allowed in the tailgate areas—though this policy is 
difficult for some teams to enforce because not all teams require random searches of 
vehicles entering their grounds. Moreover, no team prohibits fans from carrying 
backpacks in the tailgate area, which could hide a weapon or a bomb. While backpacks 
are strictly prohibited from the entering the seconadry perimeter around the stadiums, the 
ability for people to carry these items without being searched in the tailgate areas could 
prove disasterous. 
Second, the rules that apply—and that do not apply—to the parking and tailgate 
areas are similar across all the teams I analyzed. All teams identify which league owned 
lots allow for tailgating, as well as those that should only be used for general game 
parking. With that, all teams also disclose their exact tailgating rules and area maps on 
their official websites that fans can reference to. The information posted on team websites 
could therefore serve terrorists with useful information in finding weaknesses in the 
tailgate areas to better plan attacks. 
Third, all teams specify which team-owned lots allow for tailgating, and what 
times these activities can take place in relation to the start and stop of a game. All of the 
eight teams I analyzed have similar timeslots for when tailgating can take place in their 
lots. Generally speaking, tailgate activities are allowed to start four to five hours before 
the game and must end 30 minutes prior to kickoff. Tailgating can resume once the game 
ends for another one to two hours. Many fans consider the tailgating experience to be a 
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major component of the overall experience in attending football games. Therefore, many 
of the fans that frequent games will spend hours both before and after the game itself 
tailgating—perhaps even more time tailgating than watching the game. As such, the 
tailgate area demands more and more unified attention from the league. 
C. SECURITY FORCES AND VEHICLE SEARCHES AT TAILGATES 
In researching the tailgate rules for a quarter of the league’s teams, I found that 
only two of these teams made any mention of random vehicle searches to enter team-
owned lots. The Dallas Cowboys and New York Giants are the only teams that randomly 
search vehicles entering their parking lots. The Dallas Cowboys stadium in Arlington, 
Texas, has a policy that “all vehicles parking within the Stadium's secured parking 
perimeter are subject to a security inspection before being allowed to park.”318 The New 
York Giants have a similar policy in that “those ticket holders refusing a search of their 
vehicle will not be permitted to enter the MetLife Sports Complex.”319 The Giants also 
inform their fans that “all vehicles are subject to search by New Jersey State Police which 
could include a canine unit.”320 
The rest of the teams I looked at do not make any mention of randomly searching 
vehicles entering their lots, but it is possible that certain franchises do not disclose 
vehicle search procedures to prevent terrorists from being able to plan around these 
measures. However, if some franchises, in practice, fail to randomly search vehicles 
entering their lots then this could leave the affected teams more vulnerable to large-scale 
attacks. While it would be easier for a person to sneak in small explosive devices or guns 
on foot to the tailgates, the “key concern is vehicle bombs” because of their inherent 
ability to cause widespread devastation in an instant, according to Edward Connors in his 
law enforcement guide.321 Additionally, the vehicle itself could be used as a formidable 
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weapon, like with the 2016 event in Nice, France, where more than 80 people were run 
down and killed by a large truck. 
To mitigate the risk of attacks taking place on team-owned lots, all teams share 
security responsibilities with their local law enforcement to protect fans. For example, at 
Seattle Seahawks games, the “CenturyLink Field security, Seattle Police, Seattle Fire 
Department, and King County Sheriffs will patrol the lot to ensure the safety of all 
guests.”322 The New York Jets also enforce this same type of roving tactic for 
counterterrorism in that “MetLife Stadium and the Jets are actively monitoring all lots 
with additional security and there are patrols to enforce the one car, one spot policy.”323 
1. Policies for Large Vehicle Parking 
The threat of a weapon in or of a vehicle only gets bigger—literally—in the case 
of recreational vehicles (RVs) in the tailgate area. The parking availability for RVs in 
team-owned lots varies greatly from team to team. Two of the teams analyzed—the 
Green Bay Packers and Seattle Seahawks—do not allow RVs to park in their lots. For 
example, the Packers advertise on their website that “no busses, R.V.s or oversized 
vehicles are allowed in the Lambeau Field lot.”324 Despite some teams taking this 
measure to keep RVs out of team owned lots, these massive vehicles can still find 
parking in privately owned lots where other tailgates take place. The Seattle Seahawks, 
for instance, inform their “fans interested in RV parking and tailgating, there are a 
number of lots a short walk from CenturyLink Field.”325 
Some teams, like the Baltimore Ravens, Denver Broncos, Dallas Cowboys, and 
New York Giants allow RVs to park in designated lots on a limited basis, and, as noted, 
the Cowboys and the Giants also reserve the right to search these vehicles randomly. At 
Denver Broncos games fans can park their RVs on team lots, but will “be subject to 
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additional charges.”326 Because the Denver Broncos and Baltimore Ravens do not search 
vehicles entering their parking lots, they might be more vulnerable to larger explosive 
devices, because RVs are capable of carrying a larger payload than standard passenger 
vehicles. The Buffalo Bills could also be at risk, because they have the most relaxed 
stance regarding RV parking of any of the teams I examined. Not only do the Bills not 
search RVs or restrict the time or places that they can park, but their “tailgate lots have 
been paved and striped with oversized parking spaces to allow for more tailgating 
space.”327 
2. Stadium Parking Restrictions 
Certain teams restrict their parking facilities to fans who have pre-paid parking 
permits. For example, the New York Giants require their fans to have a “pre-paid parking 
permit…for all vehicles entering the MetLife Sports Complex.”328 The Baltimore Ravens 
have a similar policy in that “all lots at M&T Bank Stadium are sold in advance by 
permit only,” but fans can still park in privately owned lots to tailgate.329 Perhaps the 
most extreme restrictions for fan parking are in Green Bay where “the entire stadium lot 
is sold out to holders of season parking passes.”330 This policy indicates that Green Bay 
essentially predetermined which vehicles will park in its tailgating lots throughout the 
season, unless, of course, a parking pass is sold secondhand. Restricting parking to pre-
paid permits could be a useful tactic to mitigate the risk in league-owned parking lots 
because this measure would add an additional hurdle for a terrorist planning an attack. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
To mitigate the risk of terrorism, all teams should enact policies to enforce 
random vehicle searches for teams entering lots. This type of measure would reduce the 
risk of terrorists bringing explosive devices into parking lots. Additionally, all teams 
should have policies that all large vehicles, defined uniformly, will be searched prior to 
entering their team owned lots. Creating a cohesive, standard security screening process 
of vehicles entering tailgate lots would help to reduce the risk of weapons entering these 
zones. 
The ability for anyone to enter tailgates on foot also poses a problem because 
pedestrians can carry backpacks potentially filled with weapons or explosive devices. To 
prevent terrorists from sneaking weapons into these areas, the tailgates should be lined 
with either police or NFL security forces to check to contents of bags entering lots. An 
additional security measure would be to have canine units both lining tailgate entry areas 
and roving the lots to search for weapons. These security measures would be useful in not 
only stopping actual weapons from entering the tailgates on foot, but also serve as a 
useful deterrent tool. 
The final area in need of remedy is that the third-party–owned lots lack 
standardization under NFL policy rules. The NFL should therefore reach out to third-
party lot owners to create similar unified policies in these lots, and provide said lots with 
NFL security forces as needed. This measure will help to reduce the chance of terrorists 
attacking lots not owned by the league. 
Funding the security measures to protect both franchise and third-party owned 
lots would likely have to be provided by the NFL. The league’s inherent need to achieve 
a safe environment for its fans, personnel, and structures serves its interests, so the NFL 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 pushed several industries across the world to make 
major changes in their security measures. As prominent examples, the American aviation 
industry, the EPL, and the NFL all have robust security schemes of their own, but much 
can be learned by comparing security measures and applying them to other industries. In 
this conclusion, I will compare the EPL and American aviation examples to the NFL’s 
security scheme to determine what could be applied to the NFL in order to better protect 
its fans and industry from potential terrorist attacks. 
First in this chapter, I compare the security manuals and reforms used by each 
industry to see how well the NFL is keeping up with aviation and EPL security reforms. I 
then analyze the security manning and chain of command used by each industry to 
protect its customers and infrastructure. Next, I compare and contrast the tools used for 
security by the different industries to assess how well the NFL is keeping up with the 
others. The next section compares the experience of the associated customers of these 
industries, and, finally, I give my final assessment on how well the NFL is doing to 
protect its games. 
A. SECURITY REFORMS 
The NFL took a proactive approach to security by adopting new policies and 
increasing funding and security personnel to protect its games. In this section, I discuss 
how the NFL has achieved its mission to protect its fans compared to the other two 
industries. 
1. Security Manuals and Policies 
Both the aviation industry and the EPL have adopted security manuals to protect 
their customers and to create a minimum threshold for protection for their facilities and 
customers. Aviation’s use of the National Strategy for Aviation Security has set the 
standard for security in U.S. airports, and this manual and airports must conform to this 
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standard.331 The EPL, on the other hand, uses the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, 
otherwise known as the Green Guide.332 Additionally, the EPL uses the Terrorism 
Protective Security Advice for Stadia and Arenas, for security measures to protect 
fans.333 Both of the EPL’s manuals are state driven and the league choses to abide by 
these rules. Between the two EPL manuals, all stadium considerations, aspects 
concerning security manning protections, and threat mitigations are covered. 
The NFL went above and beyond these industries when it created its Best 
Practices for Stadium Security manual, or Best Practices Guide, to mitigate threats. 
Unlike the aviation and EPL examples, the NFL was proactive in creating its Best 
Practices Guide by assessing the likelihood of attacks and in analyzing how to best 
mitigate specific types of attacks. Since the NFL security guide falls under the SAFETY 
Act, its technologies and measures have been scrutinized and approved by DHS, and the 
league does not have to disclose its manual to the public.334 By keeping this manual 
secret, it makes its security measures more difficult to counter. This measure, in a sense, 
puts the NFL’s security scheme above the others. 
2. Funding 
The funding for these various security schemes is very different. In the aviation 
example, a large amount of funding for security comes from the taxpayers and is 
channeled through Congress. Aviation security is extremely expensive since the manning 
and security technologies are used in every airport around the United States on a daily 
basis. Contrary to American aviation, the EPL funds its own security and pays for local 
law enforcement to help secure its games.335 The NFL is a hybrid of these two models, in 
that the league funds its own private security forces at its games but does not solely pay 
for police to help secure games. 
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B. SECURITY MANNING AND CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The security manning in aviation has grown tremendously with the advent of the 
TSA, whose primary mission is to protect U.S. airports on a daily basis. Furthermore, 
airports also use state and local police forces to enhance airport security.336 There is a 
good working relationship between the TSA and police to reduce security seams at 
airports. 
The EPL clearly defines its security chain of command, as every aspect of 
security is determined and funded by the league itself and determined by the safety 
officer.337 The amount of security and police needed is assessed prior to each game, and 
the safety officer determines the security roles for each. 
The NFL also has its own massive security workforce to secure its games, which 
is a combination of league security personnel and local law enforcement. Prior to each 
NFL game, similar to the EPL example, the team’s security staff will have a meeting to 
determine threats and postures to protect the game.338 Depending on the game’s threat 
assessment, the given franchise will employ the proper amount of both police and NFL 
security forces in and around its stadium. 
1. The Security Forces 
The NFL’s security manning has grown tremendously since 9/11 through both the 
use of its own security team and its partnerships with various law enforcement agencies. 
These additional security forces have helped the league to curtail the risk of terrorist 
attacks at its games, and the league continues to flex its security forces to meet the 
perceived threats. 
Similar to the aviation example, the NFL uses both its own security forces and 
local police forces to protect its customers and infrastructures; however, the TSA 
employs a much larger permanent workforce. The NFL security force is different from 
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the example of aviation in that the league only needs to maintain a small security 
workforce throughout the year to protect a minimum of ten home games per franchise 
between pre-season and regular season games. 
The EPL example is a more useful comparison in this case because the 
professional soccer league’s franchises only play nineteen regular season home games 
each year. The EPL, similar to the NFL, maintains a small permanent security workforce 
and also staffs its stadiums with both police and security stewards, or security forces, to 
cover the inside and outside of the stadiums. The NFL’s security posture, deduced from 
the limited information available to the public from its Best Practices Guide, is similar to 
the EPL and on par with its next closest sporting league in terms of popularity and 
revenue. 
What is unclear is how well the NFL compares to the EPL in terms of training its 
security staffers. The EPL is a proponent of continuously training all members of its 
security staff to maintain minimum thresholds for a given position, and this training is 
both mandatory and part of their security culture.339 It is unclear if the NFL also has a 
similar security culture to the EPL in terms of training because this information is not 
available to the public. 
2. Intelligence 
Another major component to the security personnel related to protecting the NFL 
from attacks is their ability to gather and disseminate intelligence related to a stadium’s 
vulnerabilities. The league gathers all of its intelligence from both federal and local law 
enforcement agencies, and shares this information with its various need-to-know staff 
during pre-game risk assessment meetings.340 The process of using intelligence can be 
shown as successful in that the league has not been attacked, and the league does take a 
proactive approach to keeping its games safe through its partnerships with various law 
enforcement agencies. 
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The EPL takes a slightly different approach by employing its own small 
intelligence team for its individual franchises. The team tailors its work specifically to 
protect the people, games, and infrastructures at home games. It could prove beneficial 
for the NFL to also employ highly qualified intelligence officers for its individual 
franchises that could work with the FBI or local law enforcement to better understand the 
threats posed to teams at individual events. 
Aviation’s use of databases that maintain specific information on individuals 
helps to keep airports safe by reducing the likelihood of a known terrorist or suspect from 
gaining access into the secure areas of airports.341 This type of measure could be helpful 
at NFL games. The EPL also maintains a list of individuals who are banned from its 
facilities.342 The NFL should lobby to include the use of databases in its Best Practice 
Guide and start checking the identification cards of all adults entering games to reduce 
the chances terrorists entering stadiums. This measure could take place inside the 
secondary perimeter and well before the metal detectors, so that the lines will not be 
slowed significantly. 
C. SECURITY MEASURES 
The use of technologies like metal detectors and cameras have helped the league 
to prevent terrorism at its games, despite a large number of attacks occurring at mass 
gatherings and in population centers in Western countries, especially over the last two 
years. Additionally, the NFL’s measures to mitigate terrorism, such as the Bag Policy and 
If you see something, say something campaign have been beneficial in protecting the 
hundreds of league games that occur every season. 
1. Metal Detectors 
The NFL uses conventional metal detectors to screen its fans prior to entering the 
stadiums, which is quite different from both the aviation and EPL examples. Aviation 
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uses whole-body scanners or AITs, which are the most effective method of clearing 
someone of metal; however, these technologies are not implemented at NFL games. 
First, the sheer size of WBS or AIT scanners is significantly larger than the NFL’s 
conventional metal detectors.343 Therefore, teams would not be able to fit the same 
amount of WBS or AIT metal detectors around their inner perimeters, which would 
create further congestion around stadiums and slow lines that could be easily targeted by 
terrorists. Second, the WBS or AIT scanners would likely take more time to use per 
customer, which could also slow the rate at which fans pass from the secondary to inner 
perimeter areas. Third, the WBS or AIT metal detectors used in airports in their current 
state might not be suitable for prolonged outdoor use in harsh outdoor NFL conditions, 
like a hot and humid game in Miami or a freezing and snowing game in Chicago. 
Furthermore, WBS and AIT technologies require people to empty their pockets, remove 
bulky items like coats and jackets, and strip off items such as belts, in order to pass 
through the detection device.344 The use of WBS or AIT technologies would be difficult 
for the NFL implement because it would significantly slow the rate at which people enter 
the stadiums. Additionally, this type of measure would likely be considered cumbersome 
to fans despite being used to this measure at airports. 
The EPL, on the other hand, uses both metal wanding and the pat-down methods 
to screen its fans entering their stadiums. While these methods are more similar to the 
NFL’s use of conventional metal detectors than to aviation’s, they would still not be 
suitable for the NFL’s metal detecting needs. First, the metal wanding and pat-down 
methods take more time per customer than do the walkthrough metal detectors, therefore 
creating a longer line for fans entering the games.345 Second, metal wanding is less 
effective than conventional walk-through metal detectors in discerning metals, especially 
when considering that the wand detects only over the areas that it passes over.346 Third, 
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the NFL has tried the pat-down method in the past, but has since opted to instead use 
conventional metal detectors. 
The NFL’s use of conventional walk-through metal detectors is the best fit for its 
security needs since it balances the aspects of reducing the cue of fans to enter the games 
and is proven to be suitable for all weather conditions. Furthermore, it is reliable, and it 
adequately detects the presence of metals on people entering the stadiums. Additionally, 
people attending NFL games are used to the conventional metal detectors, and can 
quickly remove the necessary items from their pockets prior to pass through security. 
The high attendance rates at NFL games indicate that fans are not significantly 
opposed to the league’s screening procedures. Additionally, the league started its Voice of 
the Fan annual survey, which serves to inform each team about how well it is performing 
in relation to others, so that objections by fans to screening procedures can be 
identified.347 The NFL attempts to keep its fans as safe as possible, while trying to not 
create too much security that takes away from the enjoyment for fans. 
2. Cameras 
The NFL’s use of cameras is on par with both American airports and the EPL. 
The NFL places cameras throughout the stadium and in all security perimeters and 
continuously monitors them. Cameras allow the league to quickly respond to threats 
emulating from each security perimeter, whether that is the inner, middle, or outer zone. 
One potential shortfall of camera surveillance is the lack of cameras in outer 
perimeters. The NFL should place more cameras to survey the outer perimeters, 
specifically the tailgate areas. While placing more cameras in tailgates around the 
stadiums would be costly, both in terms of camera placement and in the need for 
additional security members to monitor them, this method could be useful in helping to 
quickly identify suspicious activity and to deter terrorists from attacking these areas. 
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3. Measures to Mitigate Terrorism 
Compared to the American aviation industry and the EPL, the NFL has been 
proactive in its response to perceived threats since the 9/11 attacks. In aviation, the 
creation of many security measures to thwart terrorist activity, whether limiting what 
passengers can carry onto planes, creating no-fly lists, or having a more robust 
professional security team in the TSA, all happened in the wake of the 2001 attacks. In 
the EPL example, its many measures to mitigate hooligans and accidents at games came 
in response to several events in the 1980s that threatened the livelihood of English 
professional soccer.348 As part of these changes, the EPL created the Football Banning 
Orders that limits the chances of hooligans from entering or getting near the stadiums 
without being spotted.349 Additionally, the EPL also uses undercover cops deployed 
around the stadiums to spot any suspicious activities. 
The NFL is different from both of these examples in that it not only analyzes its 
vulnerabilities based on the kinds of attacks that have taken place in crowded areas in the 
United States and abroad, but also encourages teams to tailor their security approaches to 
meet their own security needs based on different factors. The NFL’s use of its Bag Policy 
and If you see something, say something campaign have helped mitigate risks in these 
highly publicized and massively attended events. Additionally, the NFL’s partnership 
with DHS in getting accepted under the SAFETY Act as a QATT has demonstrated that 
the league is determined to protect its fans to the best of its ability.350 
D. CONCLUSION 
My initial hypothesis for this thesis was that the NFL had likely made the 
necessary changes to protect its fans in NFL stadiums, but that the league would likely 
need to increase security measures in its stadiums’ secondary security perimeters and 
outer perimeters. After analyzing available information regarding the NFL’s security 
policies, and comparing these to the EPL and American airport examples of security, it 
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appears that the NFL has made adequate changes to its security posture in the various 
security perimeters in the years since 9/11 and in relation to more recent incidents, such 
as after the Boston Marathon attack. 
The inner and secondary perimeters for NFL games, which include the stadium 
and security lines, respectively, appear to be as protected as could reasonably be expected 
for sports-related security. It would be extremely difficult for someone to sneak weapons 
through security lines and into stadiums. The use of conventional body scanners and 
trained personnel makes it nearly impossible for someone to circumvent security to gain 
access into the stadiums. Additionally, the high police presence at NFL games both in the 
inner and secondary perimeter affords the league an opportunity to quickly confront 
threatening situations with police force. 
The NFL takes the protection of each game seriously, as demonstrated by having 
a threat analysis prior to each event. This means the league is paying attention to 
changing threats globally, especially sports-related threats, and alters its security manning 
and posture accordingly. 
The major deficit in the NFL’s security scheme relates to its outer security 
perimeter and most notably the tailgate areas. The difficulty here is that these areas are 
massive and spread out, and third-party vendors own some of the lots. To prevent 
problems in these lots, the league will need to hire more security personnel and request 
for more police forces to patrol these areas. The league will also need to search 
backpacks or restrict them from being carried into lots. Additionally, franchises should 
create a partnership with all known third-party tailgate areas to ensure that the same 
security occurs in these areas. 
The last area of major concern in tailgate areas is that some teams do not publish 
having random vehicle search procedures. To mitigate this risk, all teams should adopt a 
policy of randomly searching vehicles entering their lots while searching all large 
vehicles prior to entering, such as RVs or large vans. At the same time, all changes in 
tailgate security will need to be balanced against the reaction from fans to prevent fans 
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from choosing not to attend games because of excessive or needlessly intrusive search 
policies in the lots. 
The league will have to continue changing its security procedures each season to 
stay ahead of the threat of terrorism. Recent attacks worldwide demonstrate a trend that 
such terrorist organizations as ISIS will seize any opportunity to attack Western 
cultures—ideally causing spectacular damage. These recent attacks have all involved the 
use of guns, explosive devices or vehicles, as their means to kill people. The NFL has 
taken measures to mitigate all of these risks associated with these terrorist tactics, as well 
as other types of attacks. To maintain its ability to stop terrorism at games, the NFL will 
need to continue watching the types of attacks happening around the world, and evolve 
their counterterrorism measures in their annual meetings to ensure all teams are protected 
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